Results 6,421-6,440 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: And he outlined a recipe for banks which he alleges the recipe is: grow like crazy, make terrible quality loans resulting in record profits for a period, senior leadership made wealthy and then catastrophic losses. Do you recognise that in relation to the Bank of Ireland?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: Well, your growth ... the growth of Bank of Ireland balance sheet in 2004, 2005 and 2006 was average of 20%. Loans of €9 billion was transferred to NAMA. Your profits double from 2004 to 2007, and you yourself earn €12 million in that time; is that not a justification, or is it, of what Professor Black says?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: If it stood the test of time, how did €9.9 billion bad loans result?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: Can I ask you in relation to, just a second ... Yes, Professor Morgan Kelly in 2006 or 2007 could refer to about 30 studies of housing and property bubbles around the world, all of which, without exception, collapsed catastrophically. Why couldn't senior bankers be aware of this, which was well worked out in the previous 20 years, and know that what you were doing with the huge lending,...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: Well, I did read myself academic studies in the late 90s which would have predicted what happened in Ireland. I've asked bankers that came in here why they weren't aware of it, but they weren't.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: Yes?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: Yes, and-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: -----you made that point earlier as well. Mr. Goggin, do you work with Apollo Global Management currently?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: Yes, it's sometimes referred to as a vulture fund, buying up properties, including those that the taxpayers bailed out. Can I refer to an article in herald.iein 2011, and I'll just quote from the article in relation to that, and ask you if you agree or disagree? It refers to Apollo and to Mr. Goggin buying distressed property loans from the Irish banks at a hefty discount, and then selling...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: What's your ruling, Chair?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: Well, let me just ask Mr. Goggin perhaps that ... from the point of view of ordinary people out there and the taxpayer, who have, I think we can agree, suffered grievously as a result of the banking and bubble crash, and the austerity that was ushered in as a result, do you understand, Mr. Goggin, how victims of that crash might be extremely angry at you and those other bankers, whom they...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: Do you understand how they would feel aggrieved and angry?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Joe Higgins: Are they justified?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Institute of International and European Affairs
Governance of the ECB: Past, Present and Future (30 Apr 2015) Joe Higgins: Go raibh maith agat, a chathaoirligh. Mr. Trichet, was the involvement ... what was the involvement of the European Central Bank in the decision of the Ireland Government to seek a so-called troika bailout? And did the ECB threaten sanctions if it wasn't sought?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Institute of International and European Affairs
Governance of the ECB: Past, Present and Future (30 Apr 2015) Joe Higgins: Yes, okay. Let me be more specific then. In your letter then to the Minister for Finance on the 19th November you said "It is the position of the Governing Council that it is only if we receive in writing a commitment from the Irish Government, vis-à-vis the Eurosystem on ... four ... points that we can authorise further provision of [emergency liquidity]." And then you say that a...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Institute of International and European Affairs
Governance of the ECB: Past, Present and Future (30 Apr 2015) Joe Higgins: Well-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Institute of International and European Affairs
Governance of the ECB: Past, Present and Future (30 Apr 2015) Joe Higgins: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Institute of International and European Affairs
Governance of the ECB: Past, Present and Future (30 Apr 2015) Joe Higgins: The question Mr. Trichet is, were you there to save the Irish people or were you primarily interested in saving the big European bankers who were heavily exposed in Ireland? And up to 2008, capitalist European bankers and bondholders, as you know, gambled wildly and speculated on commercial and residential property. And created a huge bubble in pursuit of super profits. Now that is what...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Institute of International and European Affairs
Governance of the ECB: Past, Present and Future (30 Apr 2015) Joe Higgins: Well, Mr. Trichet, you didn't address if it's moral just and right that the private debts of bankers, because of their reckless activity, should be put onto our people and seven years of massive austerity. And my last question to you, Mr. Trichet ... you spoke of a consensus in late 2010 that essentially burning bondholders was too risky. Can I ask you, Mr Trichet, who was the consensus with...