Results 6,141-6,160 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (10 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Carswell mentioned that by around 2004 it would have taken a benign dictatorship to reverse the direction in which Anglo was going in terms of the huge growth and profit-taking, and he referred to a juggernaut of support in the markets, which I take it would mean banks, bondholders, developers, etc. On the other side of the equation, where was the voice of the small people at that time,...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (10 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: Should there be legislation controlling speculation, profiteering on building land, and the feed through to the price of an ordinary home?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (10 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: Amazon's advertisement for Mr. Carswell's 2006 book, Something Rotten: Irish Banking Scandals, states the following:Ireland has tolerated a culture of poor standards and weak regulation in its financial services sector ... A tradition of silence and evasion prevailed. Driven by an insatiable hunger for profits, some bankers had taken huge risks. But whistleblowers were unwilling to remain...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (10 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: In his statement Mr. Carswell details the cosy relationships between major players in the property sector, the construction industry and government and elected representatives. If one had not had this relationship, would the property bubble not have blown up?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (10 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: Was the presence of the Irish Financial Services Centre, IFSC, a factor in the light-touch regulation which developed? Did the IFSC Clearing House Group see regular meetings between senior public servants from the Taoiseach's Department, the Department of Finance and financial institutions? Did this play a role in the alleged light-touch regulation which transpired during the bubble?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (10 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Carswell's opening statement tells us, "There are examples of politicians and public representatives getting involved in land speculation deals, building projects and property investments, in one notable case, in partnership with a major figure from banking, while continuing to serve as public representatives, right up to and during the economic crisis." Is it Mr. Carswell's view that...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: Professor Farrell refers in page three of his written statement to the Nyberg commission and states: "The Oireachtas is notably absent from this coverage, receiving only passing reference in the Commission of Investigation report where it is noted that one of the causes of a 'systematic financial crisis' is likely to 'a parliament that remains unaware of mounting problems'." Earlier in the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: Professor Farrell has dealt well with structures in Parliament and how it should work, and whether the structures enable it to work. I am trying to clarify the issue of whether there is a different motivation that subverts that particular----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: Can politicians serve God and Mammon? Can they serve the interests of these close relationships on the one hand while serving the interests of the majority of ordinary people on the other?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: Could it be the case that no matter how efficient the workings of Parliament or parliamentary committees are, other motivations can obstruct that efficiency being deployed in the best interests of society?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: On page six, and Professor Farrell quoted this himself today as well, he writes: "The main conclusion to draw from all this is that in the period under investigation the Irish parliament performed poorly: it lacked sufficient organizational and structural fire power to provide effective scrutiny; it lacked too the political will to use what powers it did have indicating 'cultural'...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: Professor Hardiman stated on page 1 of her written introduction, under the title of privileged access to decision-making, that, "politicians, and key public officials had too little distance from powerful private sector interests, resulting in what is sometimes termed as "cronyism" or even "crony capitalism." In the letter the professor received from the banking committee she was asked to...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: The professor referred to critics and contrary views to those prevailing, by common consent, in the inflation of the bubble period, being ignored.Yesterday, Mr. Simon Carswell, who is a correspondent for The Irish Times, said the following about banks, Government, builders and regulators in his written evidence on page 2: For these parties, it was too comfortable - and indeed self-serving...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: In the course of her address Professor Hardiman stated: "Banks engaged in very risky lending practices not least because their own shareholders put pressure on the directors to match the performance of the most profitable institutions, which were also the most risky." If there is no legal restriction on profiteering, for example, in the home building industry, and profit is a key driver of...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: Professor Honohan said in his evidence today that there has been a tendency to overstate the extent of the impact of that night's decisions and that it would be hard to deny that 80% to 90% of the overall hardship that followed the bursting of the bubble was already inescapably embedded in the situation. Would he understand if many people listening to that evidence today, who suffered the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: Did the sovereign State accepting responsibility for huge amounts of debt that did not belong to it-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: -----create the burden that caused huge amounts of austerity later?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: First, is it conjecture in terms of the extent of it and, second, even it if was €10 billion or €12 billion, is it the case that very painful cuts to ordinary people in terms of their services could have been avoided with that €10 billion or €12 billion?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: That it is conjecture.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (11 Mar 2015)

Joe Higgins: I assume Professor Honohan accepts that other people would have a different view on the extent of the hardship that would have occurred, but-----