Results 6,061-6,080 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Leaders' Questions (24 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: What does that have to do with it?

Leaders' Questions (24 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: You did a bit of time yourself for protesting in the 1960s. Does the Taoiseach know that? How long were you in Mountjoy?

Leaders' Questions (24 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: How much time did you spend in Mountjoy?

Ceisteanna - Questions (Resumed): Northern Ireland Issues (24 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: Many of the questions ask the Taoiseach to do this and that. The best thing the Government could do is stay quite a distance away from Northern Ireland. It has nothing new to offer, considering that the austerity already imposed in the North by the Tory-Liberal Democrat government is causing the same social suffering, dislocation and poverty as this Government's austerity has caused here in...

Ceisteanna - Questions (Resumed): Northern Ireland Issues (24 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: -----which would otherwise go into infrastructure to create jobs and homes and to overcome the problems bedevilling working class people in the North? Finally, what does the Taoiseach say to the tens of thousands of public and private sector workers in the North who are due to go on strike and demonstrate across the North on 13 March in opposition to these policies? Does he stand in...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: In the written statement submitted by Professor Connor prior to this meeting, he said there was an excessive inflow of debt capital into Irish banks during 2003-07 and that the business, regulatory and policy failure to control this flow was the most fundamental cause of the Irish economic crisis of 2008-12. Why was there so much global liquidity at the time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: Was it not from Europe that much of the capital came into the Irish system?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: Why did investors specifically come to Ireland at that time when, for example, there was a major unemployment crisis in Europe? Why did they not invest in infrastructure or the creation of jobs elsewhere instead of piling into the Irish property market?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: Did they know that the funding was going into property, largely?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: Why did they feel it was safe? Was it because their money would be guaranteed?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: Professor Connor's submission states that "Economists were aware of these types of macroeconomic feedback effects, but in the widespread political enthusiasm for EMU, the potential macroeconomic instability from EMU-induced capital flows was down played by economists". Is he saying that economists deliberately downplayed the destabilising effects and, if so, why did they do so?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: So, for political reasons, economists-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: Is that not a perversion of what economists are supposed to be about? The professor provides three caveats to his criticism of the bank guarantee, the last of which is that the information provided by some of the banks to the Irish Central Bank may have been "deliberately embellished" to disguise their real capital positions. What does the professor mean by "deliberately embellished"?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: Was it not a Government-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: The professor did not-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: In Professor Walsh's written submission to the committee he says, "Prior to the Irish banking crisis in 2008 it was widely believed that Irish banks were highly profitable and that they had sufficient cushions to withstand a variety of challenging scenarios." He says also, "The belief was based upon accounting reports, particularly income statements and balance sheets." Let us leave that...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: Can Professor Walsh show the committee that impressive tome that he displayed; it looks like The Bible and The Koran rolled into one. How many pages are in that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: That must be nearly 500,000 words.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: Professor Walsh says on page 3, "Unfortunately, accounting standards were especially unhelpful and served to obscure the underlying nature of both profits and loan portfolios." Given what Professor Walsh has just shown us, the obscuring was certainly not due to a shortage of space, so might that as well be a mystery novel, or were accounting standards framed in such a way as to deliberately...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Joe Higgins: Given the extent of the rules and given the huge financialisation of the world financial markets over the last 20 years, by common consent, should these rules not have been advanced considerably to avoid the type of situation that developed, whereby apparently, if I have interpreted what Professor Walsh has said correctly, there was no real reporting of the huge risks that were included in...