Results 5,921-5,940 of 15,555 for speaker:Eoghan Murphy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. I'm limited for time so perhaps some of my colleagues can continue.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Thank you, Chair. Moving back then before the crisis period, in terms of the interaction with the Financial Regulator, there was an inspection of commercial property lending activities at Anglo by the regulator in May 2007, which identified 30 separate issues which required to be addressed. And you would have seen it in the evidence book that's given to you. Were you made aware of that...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Oh, sorry.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Did you see that document when it was produced at the time with the list of 30 separate issues?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay, but we heard earlier in evidence that documents like these were not shown to the board - documentation from the Financial Regulator. Would you have been aware of that when you were in the bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. So when you got this document then in your evidence booklet, the fact that the regulator would have written to the bank in 2007 with 30 different issues related to commercial property lending was absolutely news to you, surprised by the details.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: There was a response and I wanted to ask you actually about the response, but you weren't involved in formulating it.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. Just on issue 21, which is there, and it was in relation ... 21. (ii), which is on page 70, it talked about the maximum internal property development exposure target being 20% of the loan book. But at March 2007, that exposure accounted for 25% of the loan book, but the response from the bank was that it had no concern with this, that the borrowers were proven clients with large-scale...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay, and were you involved then with the Financial Regulator's five by five big developer exposure inspection of the five banks and the five biggest exposures that happened in December 2007?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Well, if you weren't involved then I'll move on. So coming back then to September 2008 and just before the guarantee, in fact, there's a presentation to the board entitled "Strategic Options" from David Drumm. He notes how the market sees Anglo as a monoline bank with a concentration risk in commercial property and he's proposing a merger with Irish Life and Permanent to create a more...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. But so, when the consideration came, I mean, what did that say to you as a senior person in the bank? Did it tell you ... did it say to you that the business had failed, that the approach that Anglo had taken in the market wasn't successful, that now it found itself in this position?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Thank you, Chair. At that point, and just immediately prior to the guarantee, did you believe that the bank was failing? And my second question is, I mean, was the bank beyond saving at that point?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Moran. Just one other area I want to look at very briefly, if I may, is the development lending and Anglo's exposure to it in 2008, because in March 2008, your bank's exposure to development lending was 15% of the loan book. By December, the exposure is at 23%, but this wasn't because you'd increased your lending; it was because you reclassified a...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: This is to do with a results announcement that you made to analysts from London and Dublin in December '08 in which 15% of the loan book had been said, in March, to be development lending exposure, but it is a reclassification that brings it to 23% at December '08, which is pretty significant, because it actually changed quite significantly the exposure the bank had at the time to speculative...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You spoke about it at that meeting with analysts.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Do you remember why that reclassification took place?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You can't. Okay. Thank you.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Thank you Chairman and thank you Mr. Went. You're very welcome. I want to look at the area, if I may, of the wholesale markets and wholesale funding and that strategy pursued by you when you were there. If we look at Vol. 1, page 106 of the evidence books, this is a-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Vol. 1, page 106, if you look at point 8.1 on the funding model ... you'll see it, half way down:The Group's lending book grew aggressively from €12.9bln in 2001 to €39.2bln in 2007. This growth was largely funded through the wholesale markets. So, can you tell me a bit about that strategy and why you decided to pursue that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Yes, but was it intentional, though, that wholesale funding would increase as it did, aggressively, as it says here in the document but at the same time, funding sourcing from retail deposits would fall? I mean, were you intentionally changing the balance, changing the mix?