Results 5,881-5,900 of 15,555 for speaker:Eoghan Murphy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Thank you. It's just then my final question. So, in your view, did the Financial Regulator ever take that leadership role?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Thank you, Mr. Walsh. Thank you, Chair.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Moran. You're very welcome. I want to begin with the crisis period beginning in '07. At the beginning of '07, a stockbroker in Davy's begins advising against the purchase of Anglo shares because he believes them to be overvalued. What was your reaction when you heard that news?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Your reaction to stockbrokers who were claiming that the stock was overvalued by two thirds and were recommending a "hold" or a "sell". Do you remember any particular reaction yourself or in the bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Have you read Simon Carswell's book on Anglo Irish Bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Well, do you mind if I quote a couple of things from that book to you?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: There was a meeting of investors in Anglo's boardroom in September 2007 - something you did regularly, you brought people in - and a stockbroker from Davy's was there who had been advising against purchasing Anglo's shares because he felt that the falling property market and rising cost of borrowing would be a problem for the bank. And it's alleged, or it's written in the book, that you...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Were you a shareholder in the bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Do you think that your position as a shareholder clouded your judgment in some way when it came to these types of issues?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You don't think so. Okay. So you don't accept the finding of the Nyberg report that this may have coloured the judgment of executives at a time of high growth for the bank.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. So the financial investment that you also had, you don't feel that it conflicted your ability to have a more sound judgment or an objective judgment when it came to things like what shareholders were saying ... or stockbrokers - excuse me - were saying about the value of the bank and its condition.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. We heard earlier from another witness that ... three key events, basically, in the crisis for Anglo and the first was the run on Northern Rock, which also happened in the same month as that meeting that you had with potential investors. Would you agree that the Northern Rock run was the first ... was the beginning of the crisis for Anglo?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Around August, okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. If we move forward then towards the end of the year ... and in December of '07 Anglo develops a policy document for ... "Stress Testing & Scenario Analysis Funding Liquidity Risk". It is in the evidence book, Vol. 2, page 37, which you would've seen. We don't have to go into the book actually - it's not that important - but it included details for stress parameters for six...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay, and were you involved in this ... in this document at all, in putting it together?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay, I mean, would senior management at the bank at the time have been aware of the domestic standing group, which was the members of the Central Bank, regulator and the Department of Finance who were working on similar stress test scenarios - but for the banking system as a whole - at this same point in time?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. And then, so, in terms of any relationship between the work the bank was doing internally to test its own self and how it might get through or manage a crisis, there was no relationship between that work being done and the work being done by the Government, which at the time was modelling - in a simulation - the possibility of an Irish bank failing and what impact that might have on...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. So, given that these ... that group risk had done this policy report and undertaken stress testing on a monthly basis, why ... in your opinion, why did the bank not react sooner then, when it came to the - and more robustly, I suppose - to the liquidity problem prior to September 2008? Why, when you are doing this at the end of 2007 and, as you say, the crisis has begun since August,...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Were you involved with any of the attempts to get the NTMA to place deposits with the bank?