Results 5,161-5,180 of 15,555 for speaker:Eoghan Murphy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You wouldn't view it as the ECB acting outside of its mandate to provide that advice?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Did this conditionality then affect the decisions that were ultimately taken on the night and also into the future?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Can I ask, should you have made an effort to inform the ECB what you were doing once that decision was taken, bearing in mind that I think the meeting started at about 6 p.m. in the evening, in the knowledge that something would have to be found in terms of a solution? Did you keep that channel open?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: And you didn't feel an obligation to inform the ECB of that decision once it was made?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: I think my understanding is that Mr. Trichet said that they heard of the guarantee through the media.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Should you have kept a constant line open to the ECB through the course of the evening as you were debating different possibilities that would have an impact on other banking systems in the eurozone?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: -----you rang the ECB prior to the meeting?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: And in relation to the Commission, Kevin Cardiff told us that the Competition Commissioner was said to be hopping mad about the guarantee. Was any attempt made the next day in relation to dealing with the Commission and their response to the guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Take it forward, then, to 12 October 2008, which is the first ever meeting of the eurozone Heads of State. And Kevin Cardiff wrote in his long statement on page 77: it was also evident that some governments had provided background briefings to journalists denigrating the Irish decision and its lack of community spirit. Worse than that, some of those briefings appeared to be deliberately...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: I want to look, then, if I may, at the Dáil debate immediately following the guarantee decision. Because in that debate Michael Noonan asked if there was a solvency problem attached to the liquidity problem and I think he was the only person who asked that. Brian Lenihan never answered the question. But did any of your Cabinet colleagues ever ask that question?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Not in the course of the decision being made or immediately afterwards?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Well can I just come back to that again, I want to come back to the ... it's Vol. 4, page 7, in the core booklets. It's the January financial stability issue scoping paper, which we discussed last week. You said earlier on this morning this was the longest liquidity squeeze since 1945. You said that about the September period. Nine months earlier in this scoping paper it said "If a period...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay, well then, just my final question if I may Chair. You talk about trusting the advice on the night, because that same scoping paper, on page 16, and this was written nine months previously to September, says that: In a period of severe financial markets turmoil, it may be very difficult to determine the true worth of the bank's assets, including its net contingent assets. ... it is...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Yes, exactly, so this was severe, financial market turmoil in one view. So why did you trust the banks, but also why did you trust the regulator, given what this paper was telling you nine months previously, what it was warning you could happen?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: They are making the point at this part is, that you can't trust the information necessarily that the regulator or the Central Bank will have, because of the incentives on the parts of the banks to misrepresent their position.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Just the point-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: It's just the point I made is you can't necessarily trust that information.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Final question Mr. Cowen, why let it become a systemic risk? Because in March of '08 you had the Governor of the Central Bank asking two pillar banks to lend to another bank and those banks said they would if that lending was guaranteed. You go forward to September, you have the exact same situation, also you're already ... you're also bringing in a system-wide guarantee for all the banks,...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Thank you Chairman, thank you Mr. Cowen again. I just want to clarify a couple of pieces of evidence that we got in previous sessions. In the run up to the bailout negotiations were you aware that Governor Honohan suggested to Minister Lenihan in April 2010 that Ireland would be next for a bailout after Greece?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: So you don't recall Mr. Lenihan passing that information on to you?