Results 4,801-4,820 of 15,555 for speaker:Eoghan Murphy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. When the chairman of the regulator, Mr. Patterson, was before us, on page 111 of his transcript, excuse me, he said that the sector concentration limits were relaxed in the 1990s to attract one particular large foreign bank, and as a result the limits were then relaxed for everyone.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Would you care to comment on it?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You don't recall the concentrations being weakened in the 1990s for one particular bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You don't recall any discussion of that, then, later on, on in relation to sector concentration limits.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. I'll move on from that, then, if I may, to the Wright report. You have read the Wright report, I take it? Do you accept its findings?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: I'll put those things to you, and ask if you agree with them then. On page 23 of the Wright report, "the public and policy makers were insufficiently sensitive to the effects of extraordinarily expansive monetary conditions at the time, and to the fact that fiscal policy was the key potential counterbalance to this pressure". Does this finding apply to you in your role at the top of the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: That's why I'm asking if it applies to you in your role.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: So on page 25 of the Wright report, paragraph 3.3.7:As the representative of the Public Service employers, the Department of Finance had an important input to the Partnership Process, and consistently warned of growing threats to competitiveness. But it did not drive the process, and was reluctant to oppose packages that included outcomes that retained labour peace for the economy as a whole....
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Reflecting on the graph we looked at earlier in relation to the memorandum in June and the budget decisions in December, Wright also says on that same page 25:Relatively clear advice to Cabinet in June on the risks of excessive spending and tax reductions was lost by the time of December Budgets. Spending pressures of this magnitude could have been resisted even within the established Budget...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You couldn't have resisted the pressures that were coming.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Were they making decisions with the appropriate advice? I ask that because on page 32 of the Wright report:There was no analysis or advice on the broader risks to the tax system from a more general downturn in economic activity from levels created in part by pro-cyclical fiscal policy. ... such analysis should have been provided and communicated forcefully to the Minister for Finance and the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Just a final question because I'm ... I'm out of time. You said earlier on, "We weren't successful in making our advice stick." So, were the decisions taken in the budget contrary to the advice of the Department?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: So, the budgets decided-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: -----the budgets decided after 2003, were decided contrary to the advice of the Department of Finance was giving for that budget year?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Thank you.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Mr. Doyle. So, a few brief questions following on from your earlier evidence today. You said earlier on that accepting the consensus view of the soft landing was a mistake. But were you not a part of formulating that consensus view ... in that language soft landing? Because we heard in evidence from Tom O'Connell about the 2007 financial stability report...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Because according to Mr. O'Connell, the editorial control was actually exercised by the board in a one-day or two-day session during which they would finalise the language for the financial stability report and that the language-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: But do you recall receiving that first draft and-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You said earlier on that September was the crisis point but there were earlier crises in 2008 and one in particular was the St. Patrick's weekend-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: ----- in March of that year. At that point, one bank, no one would lend to one bank in the Irish economy. In another bank, no Irish bank would lend to. The Governor and the Financial Regulator were approaching each of the banks and asking them to lend to each other. That was the green jersey agenda. €20 billion had been wiped off bank shares in Ireland since the beginning of the...