Results 4,781-4,800 of 14,090 for speaker:Marc MacSharry
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Again, we had people who claimed to be dissenting voices from those sections that were in here. The evidence will show who they were. Did any of those people highlight to you, "Look", you know, I've had serious concerns here. I don't have enough staff", or ,"Nobody's listening", or, "There's a bubble building", or, "We're not doing anything on the macro-prudential regulatory side, we're...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: -----were able to share that with you? Did that not ring alarm bells for you or did they just simply not share anything with you?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: And is it fair to say nobody did?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Thanks very much.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Were they attempting to pair institutions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Thank you Chairman and welcome Mr. Chopra. Thank you for taking the time. What were the most contentious issues that emerged during the discussions with the troika and the Irish Government and the Irish side in the formulation of the bailout programme?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: What was the issue around the promissory notes?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: In the operation of the troika, did you feel that the IMF were an equal player or did you feel that the ECB or the Irish Government or others were proportionately stronger in promoting their point of view?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: You rightly pointed out the extensive experience and that this was not new territory to the IMF. The ECB in particular would not have had the lifetime experience and expertise in circumstances of crises such as these. Bearing in mind that, by your own admission, you feel that you steered things in the right direction but didn’t win every battle, what alternatives should have been...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: You were wholesome in your praise for all of the people that you worked with through the programme, elected people, people on the technical side, officials and so on. Obviously the fallout from this has seen a contribution from the Irish people that is second to none and indeed without any civil unrest that I’m sure your own organisation would be very familiar with. Would you say...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Just a couple of quick points just specifically on the burden-sharing. We had Kevin Cardiff who was here with us and in his opening statement he said about these issues and I quote: There had even been early indications of a positive hearing from US Treasury Secretary Geithner. We heard back, however, via the IMF team in Dublin, that instead of a positive response, there had been a strong...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: You mentioned earlier, while you were in a position to recall certain meetings and confirm they took place, and even the content of some meetings, you couldn't go into the specific deliberations, and we fully understand that. Was there ever discussions, to your knowledge, at the G10 ... sorry, at the G20 in 2010 conference in South Korea about Ireland entering a programme?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Would you have any comment on the ECB's refusal to co-operate with this committee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Did it surprise you?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: And the rules, of course, of the IMF, didn't prohibit you in your private capacity from coming in. We're all very grateful for that. Did you find it unusual that, given the same rules apply to the ECB, that Jean-Claude Trichet didn't take a similar opportunity to attend and-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: And we're very grateful for it indeed. Thank you, we'll move on from that. Can you ... you mentioned earlier that, that a programme was under way, almost, before the formal IMF programme, troika programme was entered into. Are you satisfied that the programme, designed I suppose under the stewardship of the late Brian Lenihan and the previous Government, and continued to a great extent by...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: And just before I give you my very final question, can I ask you, can you identify the fundamental changes in policy that occurred in the change in Administration here in election 2011?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: -----or differences. So, and then, and ... on the 12 quarterly reviews, if there was a suggestion from a government that we wanted to adjust the process of getting to the bottom line, were governments free to do that? So were they free to generate revenue from X or Y or was that prescribed by yourselves?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Finally then, can I ask were the social consequences of the bailout programme considered during the programme discussions and how were these consequences considered? And what was the nature of the discussion?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)
Marc MacSharry: Thank you very much.