Results 4,521-4,540 of 7,082 for speaker:John Paul Phelan

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay, that's fair enough.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thank you, Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Chopra. I've a lot of questions so we'll get into it. In your opening statement you state the following: Ashoka Mody made an informal visit to Dublin in February 2009. That visit was the first time the staff raised the question of whether an IMF-supported financial arrangement might be useful to help smooth the inevitable adjustment facing the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay, that's fair enough. Can I ask you about the process then rather than maybe specifics? What is the process within the IMF, you know, when that initial type of consultation takes place? Is it somebody such as yourself who brings it, kind of, up the chain of command in the IMF to see whether ... or what actions are necessary on a political level ... that a programme would actually happen?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. I want to put to you a statement. Mr. Cardiff, the former Secretary General of the Department of Finance, in evidence to the inquiry stated the following, "Then, in 2009, I believe there were hints in Washington, possibly also in Dublin, that, you know, IMF would be available if we wanted them." Would I be correct in understanding from your statement that what you're saying is that...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. I also want to put another quote from Mr. Cardiff, from his evidence to the inquiry. He said ... in referring to getting an understanding as to how Ireland might make an application or enter an IMF programme, he said, should the need arise around September 2008 ... the quote is, he had "asked a colleague to make a discreet inquiry as to how you get into these things." Were you aware...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: So you weren't aware of any initial noises from Ireland at the end of 2008?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. On page 3 of your statement, you refer to the infamous Trichet-Lenihan letters and you state, and I quote, that "the demands in the ECB letters went beyond that institution's mandate", which is-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Indeed. From the letters, then, between Mr. Trichet and Mr. Lenihan ... can you elaborate on the statement - that's really what I'm ... the point I'm trying to get at - and how, in your view, they were going beyond their mandate?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Can I ask you then, as a brief supplementary: did you get an opportunity, or did you feel it was appropriate, to raise those concerns about the nature of the ultimatum, as you said, in those letters?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: So you had no opportunity, I suppose, at the time to raise those concerns.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Mr. Ahearne was here yesterday, the former adviser to Minister ... the late Minister Lenihan, and he spoke about a meeting between ... when himself and Mr. Lenihan went to Washington D.C. in early October 2010 to meet the IMF, including you, he believed, and that there was a discussion about senior bondholders in Anglo Irish Bank at that particular meeting. Do you recall the meeting and can...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: As you note in your witness statement, Mr. Ó Ríordáin from Arthur Cox, a legal adviser to the Department of Finance, gave evidence to the inquiry where he detailed meetings with the IMF in November 2008 where Lee Buchheit was present. Was ... who asked Mr. Buchheit to become involved in the Irish issue or asked him, indeed, to come to Ireland? And are you aware did he meet...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Was his advice asked about restructuring Irish sovereign debt, as in Greece where he was heavily involved, or was his presence exclusively related to senior bondholders?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Can you advise if the IMF view on burden-sharing ... can you advise us on the IMF view on burden-sharing and if it was materially different from the EU institutions and, if so, can you outline that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Was there an ongoing discussion then, during your time here, with the counterparties of the ... from the European institutions as to ... or how long was that discussion going on for? You can't really tell us, I suspect, of the detail of it but ... what was the nature of it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay, one final question. Do you feel yourself, from your time in Ireland, that you became the presentable face of the troika and that perhaps, others might observe from the outside that other members of the troika hid behind your affability and presentability in terms of being that -----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: -----face?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: It's a fact.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thanks.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thank you, Chair. Mr. Chopra, three areas I want to cover. Firstly, briefly, the flexibility allowed to a state that's under an IMF programme to renegotiate that programme. You indicated earlier that IMF looks at the bottom line, but is there a credibility test or, you know, what type of constraints are on that flexibility to renegotiate?