Results 4,421-4,440 of 7,082 for speaker:John Paul Phelan

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: There are a couple of quotes that I just want to put to you from it, in particular, one at the bottom of page 31, "Anglo Irish Bank Overview". It says, and bearing in mind this was November 2008, "We believe that Anglo Irish Bank will be the most profitable and capital generative of all publicly quoted financial institutions in Ireland over the five year period", the five-year period being...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: I think nationalisation was, I think it would be fair to say, directly related to the level of loss, but I know the point you are making. I want to - well, I suppose - ask you also in relation to your own time working in Anglo firstly. When again, just remind me ... I was just trying to find the date that you started working in Anglo.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: You've worked in several different financial institutions at this stage. What was the overriding culture of Anglo Irish Bank? Was it very different than other institutions that you worked in or was it largely similar?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Yes. Well, I don't want to rehash the statements or the references that have been made by the first two speakers, Senator Barrett and Deputy Murphy. You would have been portrayed in the media, in some of those books that were published and other articles, as being somewhat of an enforcer for the line. I suppose, to use a political phrase, one could equate you with a chief whip kind of role...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Those instances, were they off your own bat or were you acting on-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay, and were there other such similar discussions, robust discussions to use another political analogy?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay, well that's fair enough. Finally, I wish to ask you in relation to ... it is core document 2, pages 3 to 5. I'll get it myself, yes, "Exceptions to Credit Policy for Anglo Loans Transferred to NAMA". Information provided by the special liquidators on exceptions to credit policy for loans transferred to NAMA shows that the aggregate value of exceptions identified was almost €32...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: All right. Thank you.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thank you Chairman and good afternoon Mr. Went.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: First of all I’d just like to ask you did you appreciate the level of risks, or do you feel that there was an appreciation of the level of risk that was attached to the level of growth within your institution that was being achieved at the time you were chief executive of the organisation?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Was there an appreciation, either by yourself or at board level or at senior management level of the, the risks that were attached to the level of growth that was being achieved?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. There was another risk which subsequently transpired, which was in relation to tracker mortgages.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Were you aware of the extent of the tracker mortgage interest at risk and was that ever discussed at board level or senior management level within the institution?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: So I'm not trying to cut you short ... but there was a discussion but you didn't really take any action, is that right?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: I want to ask you about another product that you entered into, or the institution entered into, in March of 2007, shortly before you left, with Merrill Lynch - the Springboard mortgages, they were termed, to cater for individuals who were experiencing difficulties in securing lending from banks by traditional methods. In ... with the benefit of hindsight, was that a good decision?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: But there was an element of sub-prime, wasn't there?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Can I ask ... and I know you were gone, I think, at the stage, a year later, when Merrill Lynch looked to cease their involvement. Did that raise any alarm bells for you at the time? I know it was post your time as chief executive.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. I just want to change now, if I can. You've spoken in answer to Deputy Doherty in relation to the 100% mortgage issue. You're critical in your statement about the regulator, particularly about the prudential, I suppose, side of the regulator. Did you at any time voice your concerns, either internally to the board of the bank, to the bankers' federation, which you mentioned in your...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Outside of that issue? The prudential, in general, I suppose, is what I'm asking-----