Results 4,341-4,360 of 15,555 for speaker:Eoghan Murphy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: So it wouldn't have been your responsibility to comment to the bank itself but would people ... in your ... inside your expert team looking at banks and looking at Bank of Ireland, would they have been commenting to themselves or to senior partners about what was happening in the bank ... and the changes that were happening, the increases in ... say ... concentration in property lending?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay but in terms of ... have you looked at documentation from the time internal to PwC?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: And would there be documentation, e-mails for example, of people on the bank team discussing their own concerns as to strategies being pursued by the banks, separate to their role as an auditor to the bank and the risk that they might be concerned with in terms of auditing?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. The document I cited is a document from the group risk office to the group risk policy committee on 13 December 2007 and it's talking about property concentration in the group's loan book. So as part of your audit, does it concern itself with these types of documents?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Right, but to what purpose did you look at the minutes, say, for example, in these minutes, where it expresses a number of concerns about exposures?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Impairment at that point in time, not in future impairment risks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay. This document then from the group risk policy committee or to the group risk policy committee, it's the end of 2007, and it's noting that 44% of all non-mortgage lending is to property. And when you combine mortgage lending with property construction lending, it's 70% of the bank's entire loans. So did PwC ever analyse the risk level associated with the percentage share of the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Yes ... it's the two figures together.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: What about the wider concern, though, that's been expressed internally about this exposure ... this concentration exposure? I mean, if you go to page 40, half-way down the page it states, "If the GRPC [Group Risk Policy Committee] is of the view that the level of property exposure in the Group's balance sheet is too high, there are relatively few realistic options that could be considered",...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: But as it says here, if the exposure is too high and there are relatively few realistic options that could be considered. You as PwC cannot take a view on that in terms of your assessment of the bank's position.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: In finalising your accounts, then, for 2007 and this report came in December 2007, you could make no regard to this particular risk being identified and you could have no concern for the future, based on this risk?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Okay, thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Hurley, you’re very welcome. Mr. Hurley, in your opening statement you said that the Central Bank was divested of supervisory powers over financial institutions after the 2003 Act. Is that correct?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: But did you maintain responsibility for system-wide stress testing of those institutions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: But the power to conduct those tests, is that not a supervisory power of those institutions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Is it a supervisory power as well?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: But you had the power to mandate a stress test of all institutions and to write to the banks in question and get them to carry out a stress test.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: You refer in your opening statement as well to the 2006 stress test and that it was an IMF stress test. Was that an IMF stress test or was it a Central Bank stress test?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: Calibrated by the IMF.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Eoghan Murphy: So they set the scenario.