Results 4,161-4,180 of 7,082 for speaker:John Paul Phelan
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Briefly then, finally, I want to ... I won't go any more into that particular publication. Paragraph 58 was referred to by Deputy Higgins earlier, of your opening statement, where you said that there was no "constitutional impediment to introducing [further] legislative measures to provide for further burden-sharing". Was your opinion ever sought on the introduction of legislation to impose...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: And it just fell because-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: -----because the Government changed and it was at that-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Thank you ... thank you, Chairman. And good afternoon, gentlemen. I've a little less questions now because some of them have been dealt with already.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: You're all right. Firstly, actually, is it Mr. Ó Ríordáin or O'Riordan?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Ó Ríordáin. Because it was written as "O'Riordan" earlier. In relation to the 120 lawyers who you said were working in the firm on the business that you've referenced in your opening statement, how many of them would be ... would've been of a partner level in the firm can you recall?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Was there any point during the seven-year period where the Department of Finance would have been your biggest client or one of your ... one of your biggest, I should say?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Okay. I want to reference your opening statement, Mr. Ó Ríordáin. Paragraph 13.1 and quote it directly, where you said in the middle of that paragraph that "we had a limited interaction with the IMF in respect of the legal manner in which senior bondholders could participate in burden sharing." Can you, within the parameters that were operating in here today, outline to the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Was your interaction lawyer to lawyer then rather than you to somebody or, we'll say, Arthur Cox in general to somebody operating directly on behalf of the IMF?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: And they would've been the people who we all know and are familiar with in terms of names who were dealing with the IMF matters here in this-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Can I turn now, actually, perhaps to Mr. McCague? What was your views - in relation to the night of the guarantee itself - on the responsibility that the State had legally for the banking system or the position of individual banks within that system?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Well, during ... while the decision was being discussed even, I suppose-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: -----yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Okay. In reference to a comment that you made in answer to Senator MacSharry earlier, you said that you - and I think I'm quoting you correctly - you don't remember anyone making an assertion that on ... banks were insolvent on the night of the guarantee in the meetings that you attended. Was there an extensive discussion around the matter of insolvency or the potential for insolvency or...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Can I ... I just want to rewind, there's one point that I forgot to ask Mr. Ó Ríordáin earlier. In relation to the full extent of the seven years that were ... that you're referencing in your opening statement - and you spoke about the 120 lawyers who were employed over that seven-year period, or were working on these matters within the firm - can you inform the inquiry how...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: I want to turn to paragraph 5.5, which is quite a long paragraph, if I remember, because its got a number of subsections. If I can find it myself. Yes, subsection (e) of your statement, you say that the legal consequences of a failure of a bank could have included the capacity of the ECB to seize the bank's collateral. Can you, maybe, briefly outline what that would have entailed?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: So, in theory at least, the ECB could have become a ... almost a direct lender to people who held loans.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Have you heard of any examples of where that actually happened? Maybe in other jurisdictions or other examples of that.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Okay. At paragraph 6.3 of your statement you say "Anglo posed the greatest risk to the guarantee and the stability of the banking sector". Again, can you maybe elaborate on that particular statement?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (16 Jul 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Was it your advice to the Department that Anglo was of such systemic importance that the consequences of its failure would have impacted on the industry in the manner that you've outlined?