Results 3,841-3,860 of 7,082 for speaker:John Paul Phelan

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Finally, can I ask you, in light of what has transpired since, and in public comment by commentators, politicians, whoever else, do you feel yourself that you have been scapegoated for some of the decisions around the guarantee, the capital injections by the taxpayers into the banks, and the subsequent entrance into a bailout?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Beausang, good afternoon. Firstly, can I just refer to the document ... or the issue that Deputy Higgins referred to in terms of Irish Nationwide and its report ... or the report into it by Goldman Sachs? Mr. Cardiff, in his statement two weeks ago, stated to the committee, "In the first half of September 2008 [and I'm quoting him now], when it was clear that INBS...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. That's fair enough. Mr. Cardiff then went on to outline how the decision to include Nationwide in the guarantee was largely based on this previously mentioned Goldman Sachs report into Nationwide which you have referred to in, I think, paragraph 17.8 of your opening statement. I wanted to ask you, are you aware of ... I suppose you'd call them allegations that were published in a ......

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Did you express those reservations at the time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Were you aware of the evidence that Mr ... Mr. Cardiff gave that third parties, for instance, Davy's, I think he mentioned, and Mr. Desmond and others in the earlier part of 2008 were indicating to the Government that a guarantee was something that should be entered into?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Can you understand then the ... I suppose frustration, to some extent, that people might express that, you know, on the night of the guarantee decision itself ... that there wasn't a fuller basis of information for the Government available, particularly on the two, kind of, crisis institutions before they were included in the guarantee. Why was there no direct action by the Department or...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: I want turn in my two minutes that I have left to page 6 of the financial stability issue. And now, I'm not sure exactly if it's in your core documents, but it's scoping paper DOF03183-006, and I presume that can be got up on screen. There's a quote that I want to put to you from that particular document. If it ... stop the clock, John.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay, the quote is: The costs of insolvency should not transfer to the State simply because the institution in question is a bank (or other financial institution). The role of the authorities is to maintain financial stability and not to bailout shareholders of insolvent institutions. Thus, the preferred outcome for an insolvent institution may be its failure and subsequent orderly...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thank you.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thank you. Chairman. Welcome, Governor. At the start actually can I just refer briefly to a question from Deputy Murphy about exposure of individuals to several institutions? And you were adamant in your response that it couldn't happen again and we've had a lot of evidence that, you know, several property developers, in particular, were seriously exposed to a number of institutions. Can...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay, I understand.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: That wasn't the issue and I suppose I'm asking you maybe to give your professional opinion on those exposures that existed and the failure of the previous regulators to identify that as a critical shortcoming. I mean, how did that go under the radar in your opinion that-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: I want to change tack and ask you briefly again to advise the committee on measures that were taken by the banks, the Central Bank, the Government in the period post-guarantee and pre-bailout by the banks to privately get access to capital. We haven't had much information as to what happened in that regard.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: I also want to ask you in relation to your report from May 2010, on the crisis, you refer to the night of the guarantee and the lead that the Department of Finance had been taking in the inter-agency meetings during the period immediately prior to it. And you refer to the Central Bank and the regulator as playing a less central role than may have been expected. Do you have any further...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Speaking of using the expertise of the NTMA, I'm not sure if you've followed - I'm sure you haven't followed all of the evidence, you've probably a lot more to be doing than following all of the evidence of ... heard at this committee, but what do you make of the decision or the failure, I suppose, on the night of the guarantee, to have the NTMA consulted, seeing as their, you know their...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Okay. Can I then turn actually to another area that we've had a fair bit of evidence in the last couple of days, the production of IMF reports and OECD reports, going back to your own early days working in the IMF. We've had evidence and I think it was Senator Barrett yesterday touched on it a lot in his questioning of Mr. McCarthy, the tick-tacking that occurs between the Department of...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: It was the OECD, okay, yesterday. And, that corrections were made by very senior officials in the Department of Finance and for instance the IMF, in its initial draft report, had said that there should be some sort of a resolution mechanism established. A line was put through it, delete written beside it, and sure enough, when the report, the final report, was published it wasn't contained...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: You would place-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

John Paul Phelan: Thank you, Chairman. Good afternoon, Governor. I have a few ones at the start, kind of, like questions that you might have set yourself, maybe, in a previous life. I'd ask you to discuss ... there's a quote from Vol. 1 of the core documents, it's an IMF survey, 19 December 2013, "Ireland's Economy Back from the Brink, But Continued Progress Needed". The quote I want to put to you is this...