Results 3,821-3,840 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Okay. And how was that level of increased risk monitored within the bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: And the meeting of the board of 12 December 2008. Now that's been mentioned this morning, that about two thirds of the board members were absent. But at that board meeting it was reported that David Drumm and Willie McAteer had met with John Hurley and Tony Grimes at the Central Bank of Ireland and a figure of €3 billion of new capital was acknowledged as being needed. Were you...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: What was your assessment of the bank's liquidity and insolvency position on the night of the guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Was the gravity of the Anglo position understood? I ask that because the Anglo balance sheet was 60% of Ireland's GDP. Lehman Brothers, which has been mentioned by several speakers, was only 7% of US GDP. I mean, this was Ireland heading towards a real crisis, as we saw. Was that appreciated in the bank and in the people with whom you associated?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: How do you feel in retrospect of having spent time working in Anglo Irish Bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Would you prefer it wasn't on your CV?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Mr. Moran, and thank you, Chairman.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman. Thanks, Mr. Moran. On the CFDs and your discussion with Deputy O'Donnell, Mr. Carswell puts those arising in early 2007, but you weren't told until December. Was there a slowness to react to those purchases by Mr. Quinn?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: There's a suggestion from the Revenue Commissioners in 2006 there should be a stamp duty on CFDs. Would you think it was a good idea if this committee were to recommend that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: But your overall experience with CFDs would not be particularly pleasurable I suppose, would it?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Well, sometimes you tax activities which are felt to have social costs rather than benefits. Did you have any relationships with the NCB Stockbrokers - the robust discussions? Did you have some with them?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: It is reported that senior executive in Anglo sought to have a stockbroker sacked because he didn't like the views of Anglo that that stockbroker was publishing.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Right. Did you have a similar robust conversation with Irish Life and Permanent, Mr. McCarthy, at any stage?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Okay. Thank you very much.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you. No, just ... thank, you, Chairman. Well, the NTMA, we've had in evidence, formed a different view. How did you respond when you knew that the NTMA would not put money on deposit in Anglo anymore? They obviously felt the nation's pensions, etc,. were at risk.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman, and welcome to Mr. Went. The ... PTSB were very active in the residential investment property market, called RIP in the era - and I think it may be a good Freudian slip. And, in terms of annual growth in this market, with a relaxing of terms and conditions, was the level of risk associated with this growth fully understood?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: But the results seem to indicate, as you were describing to Deputy Murphy, that in loan-to-deposits, loans-to-value and sectoral concentration, major policy decisions were made which ended in tears. You went the wrong way in all three of those.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: That ... when you were describing to Deputy Murphy, you know, what was happening in terms of loans-to-deposits, loans-to-value and sectoral concentration, we were moving ... I would put the proposition - for "Yes" or "No" – we moved in the wrong direction, I'll put it to you, in relation to all of those and that’s why this committee is here ... this inquiry is here.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: But on page 63 in the volume, January 2006 ... reporting on December, says it was up 93% on the previous December and then you go to page 89, November 2005, approvals 119% up. Now was that not bound to end? That was a bubble really - I’ll put that proposition to you.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: You said in your speech in October 2004 to the Institute of Bankers that Mr. Gordon circulated from Permanent TSB that:Mr. Went [said] that he was increasingly concerned at the level of criticism being made about the banking sector in Ireland. He said, "My concern is that after a period of pretty relentless criticism, we’re coming closer to a tipping point where the cumulative effect...