Results 3,801-3,820 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you. Nyberg, on page 101 of Vol. 2, Mr. Chairman, he shares some of Mr. Moran’s concerns here: “neither [the internal audit] nor the Audit Committee was in a position to challenge credit decisions per se, where the main problems [mainly] ultimately arose". So, would you agree with Nyberg on that point, that the internal audit was too weak?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Page 101. I’m sure it will come up in time.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Did you ever feel at the time or since that - you were raising the money, that's all, you said that, lending wasn’t your province – did you ever feel like going to the lending people and say, you know, “This will come unstuck unless you guys get your act together. We’re out working our socks off raising the money, we’d like a little bit of tightening up on...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: When the terminology in the bank, monoline bank as you say, to us that means sectoral concentration, which is one of the areas, as you know, where the red lights go on, and were you aware that the regulator was concerned about concentrating in one sector and concentrating on a very small number of borrowers? Was that not a risky strategy?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: But the Davy economist whom you discussed with Deputy Murphy, he thought your shares were two-thirds overvalued and in fact the eventual discount from NAMA was 61%, so he wasn’t too far wrong. He was a good forecaster wasn’t he?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: His name is mentioned.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: But you took grave exception to that, isn’t that correct, to that stockbroker?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Or a round of applause or whatever? Did you have any contact with him after he wrote that report?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: And you disapproved, I presume, strongly, isn’t that right?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: And you had a similar cup of coffee with Morgan Kelly isn’t that right?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: And you didn’t like his views either, is that right?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes, it’s recorded that Kelly didn’t believe a word of what you told him. That’s on page 119.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: What about Mr. Murray Brown of the Financial Times, did you have an altercation with him as well?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Could you tell us about your meeting with Mr. Murray Brown or your contacts with him?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes, according to page 221 of the Anglo book by Simon Carswell:Moran gave [Murray Brown] an earful, threatening legal actions against the [Financial Times] if [he] didn’t retract the article. Moran said that Anglo had been in no more difficulty than any other Irish bank. I’m trying to build up that the industry seemed to operate in a consensus that they were right but they...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thanks, there. But, you see, if there were dissenting voices and they were treated in the way in which ... the describing of which is in Mr. Carswell's book, this one ended up costing €64 billion to taxpayers. I don't particularly mind if one company wants to entertain journalists, but this one was so serious. Do you think there was a moral hazard problem in Irish banking?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Moral hazard is when people are exempted from the consequences of their actions. We had to bail out banks; we don't bail out bicycle shops and dry cleaners. So I'm not very worried what bicycle shops and dry cleaners say to stockbrokers. I'm very worried about what happened in this case, that the dissenting voices, there was an attempt made to, I think, to quell them. And we have to as...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Did people in Irish banking think they were too big to fail and they didn't have to address the basic problems but have these discussions with journalist and stockbrokers and commentators instead?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Can I just ask you on the NAMA estimate that there was €9 billion of interest rolled up in loans transferred to it by the five banks and €3 billion related to Anglo? Were you aware of the interest roll-up included in the Anglo loan book?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Sean Barrett: Was that figure included in the board and senior management information dashboard on a regular basis, the rolled-up interest?