Results 3,121-3,140 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Sorry, the problems that arose from wholesale funding rather than the traditional base which was deposits.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you very much. Thanks, Chairman.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman, and welcome back, Mr. O'Connell. Looking through the CBFSAI reports between 2004-2009, could it be said that the emphasis was on economic development, retail sales, industrial output, the live register, productivity, inflation, house prices and so on, and not sufficiently to the financial aspects of the banking industry, which, I think, we're agreed is what brought us...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: And could you just expand briefly on how this information was communicated to Europe? There is a ... on page 64, "the Bank was not aware of ... action ... taken by [any] other national central banks in the Eurosystem, which the bank", i.e., here, "was not already taking".
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes, on restricting credit growth, because we had this very large credit growth in excess of the other countries in the eurosystem and was that communicated to Europe or proposed or discussed at any of the meetings that you were at?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: And the HERMES model, Professor FitzGerald gave evidence ... it didn't include a financial sector. Was that ever discussed at, at meetings where, where you were present?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: The phone call to the ESRI about the Alan Barrett article. Soon afterwards, as you know, all the independent articles were dropped from the quarterly economic commentary, it just became an in-house ESRI thing. Were those events connected? Was the ESRI worried that it was annoying the Central Bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Okay, thank you very much. Thanks, Chairman.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman. And I ... Mr. O'Reilly, you're welcome. I echo the Chairman's welcome for ... to you earlier. In a general question, you mentioned in your papers that you studied in Queen's in Kingston, Ontario. The World Economic Forum has rated Canada's banking system the soundest in the world seven years in a row. And, I think, in 2009 we were ranked 121 out of 123 countries -...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: And, in your 39 years ... I think, 1967 you went to the Central Bank was that-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: -----until 2006, did you see the corporate culture of Irish banking change from being one of the most conservative to being, as you said there, one of the most lowly rated of 123 countries?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Did ... yes, in your dealings with banks did you see them changing at all? Were they different from the ones you used to meet when in you were in the Central Bank first in 1967? And, what happened sub ... in 2006, '7 and '8?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: And yet the ... it cost us in 2007-'08 40% of GDP ... after Iceland, you know, the most expensive bank rescue any place. I mean, did you see anything that ... were their lending standards lower in the '80s than they were in the '60s?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Were you acquainted with the arguments over the McDowell report? Did you participate in that? He recommended completely separate regulation and the Central Bank and the Department of Finance didn't like it much and a row ensured.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Having won the battle, did ... was the war lost, because an organisation of 1,200 staff or so combined put only 35 of them into the prudential regulation of banks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Do you know was there ever parliamentary authority for that? Because here, I've never heard in my short time, a law being brought in and you can ... be implemented by principles, there are no penalties; say, you can, kids can go to school or not if they like, you can drive fast or slow if you like. Was Parliament expressly consulted on this non-statutory regulation of financial...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: When you mentioned it slowed down we found extremely slow correspondence between banks and the regulator. In one case that ... in the Honohan report, I think, a bank was felt to be problematic - Bank A, I think, he called it - in 2000, and it collapsed in 2008. Why was it taking so long to achieve regulatory control over that particular Bank A?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: The example I'm looking for is ... did people take much notice of when you were drawing matters to their attention in the Irish banking sector? And that's an example, an extreme one.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes.