Results 2,961-2,980 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Because the bank's supervisory department, Professor Honohan found, in 2000 when the Central Bank was doing it, had an approved staff of 38.5 and an actual staff of 32.5 people. And given that the Central Bank had and had subsequently 1,200 staff, the fact that so few were devoted to prudential supervision of banks, was that not a mis-allocation of resources?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Because Mr. Honohan ... Governor Honohan, as you'll know, he also has that a three-person team was responsible for Bank of Ireland and Anglo Irish Bank in 2005 so that couldn't possibly have been adequate, given the size of both of the bodies and the problems that they encountered subsequently.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Were alternative ways of supervising the prudential affairs of banks ... were they ever considered by the Central Bank board? For instance, Regling and Watson mentioned Canada as a country which had tough banking supervision and no bank crisis.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Under the current system, what should be the staffing number? I think the Central Bank now has about 1,500 staff; that's the target. How many of those should be engaged in the prudential supervision of banks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Honohan, as you know, has case study (i) and case study (ii) in his report. It's on page 73. As early as August 2000 a Central Bank official was aware of problems in the case study (i) firm and it never seems to have been corrected right through to the crisis. And some of that was on the Central Bank's watch and some of it was on the Financial Regulator's watch. The picture I get is that...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Because there were only 48 people in 2008 actually working on banking supervision and the 32 when you were in charge in 2000. Out of the staff of over 1,000, the combined bodies did not take prudential regulation of financial institutions seriously enough to allocate resources to that area. It was-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Regling and Watson say on page 37, "The supervisory culture was insufficiently intrusive, and staff resources were seriously inadequate for the more hands-on approach that was needed".
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Is there a distinction between the micro supervision and the macro role that the Central Bank had? Isn’t it bogus because if a major micro sector like the financial sector goes down, it brings the entire economy down and-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: How much arises from not adequately preparing for joining the euro? Because in the national currency days, reading, say, the biography of Dr. Whitaker, one of your predecessors ... that we were able to do this. Did we understand what the free movement of capital would be and had the Central Bank any misgivings about the loss of controls over movements of capital, interest rates and the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Even if you have asset price bubbles like the one we had?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Could the Central Bank control huge flows of capital into a country now knowing the damage that it can do?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: -----the actual limits on the growth of lending by all the lenders in a market.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman, and welcome back, Mr. Hurley. How would you benchmark the Central Bank of Ireland relative to central banks in other jurisdictions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Could I ... Thank you. Could I bring up Vol. 2 of the core documents, Chairman, at page 82? This is the notes on an ECOFIN meeting and in the last paragraph you record that:The Council recalls that it has repeatedly urged the Irish authorities, more recently in its 2000 broad guidelines of the economic policies, to ensure economic stability by means of fiscal policy. The Council regrets...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Having had a-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Having had a domestic system of bank regulation which worked, was there too much of a hiatus between the launch of the single currency and, you know, as recently as last winter, in that there's a lack of connection between the European Central Bank and national central banks, you know, which might have prevented that kind of collapse of the Irish banking system if you'd had closer contacts...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Because people might ... looking in might think there was nobody in charge of that currency from 2009 until very recently.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Was there dialogue in 2008 as the Irish crisis built up to tell Frankfurt, "We're really in trouble here; we need some assistance, because we don't have the resources ourselves to rescue these banks"?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Could I move on to page 88 of the same document, if I may, Chairman? There is a statement at the end of the second paragraph in the ECOFIN briefing notes: "In short, we supervise banking and other financial activities to the highest European and international standards." That was what we said in 2005 but that couldn't possibly be true at this juncture to say that.