Results 2,841-2,860 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Okay. Professor Brennan, who is an accountant, in 2004 she said that she was concerned about the level of sanctions outside limits, especially with regard to those who had breached both the loan-to-value and the debt service ratio limits. That was 2004.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes, thank you, Chairman. That is Deloitte, Vol. 1 and it's on page 40. So were you aware that there was concern about these matters at the board level in Ulster Bank ... by ... by an eminent accountant?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: It is 31/04 and "Professor Brennan queried the level of sanctions outside limits, especially with regard to those which breached [the limits] ... which breached both the loan to value and the debt service ratio limits."
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Well, I think it was greater in 2007 than it was 2004 when Professor Brennan raised it.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: I do believe there were concerns still of that kind in 2007. In fact, that was one of the questions we were putting to people. How was this ... raised by Professor Brennan in 2004 and nothing ... and it getting worse by 2007-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: But do you not quantify these and see they were greater in 2007 than they were in 2004, when Professor Brennan raised them?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: I don't understand your use of the word ''concern''. Because each time we come to it you ... you're not concerned. You ... you don't seek to correct the problems which the data disclose.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: And the controls didn't work. Let's go to loan-to-deposit ratio. It was 211 when it should have been 120. And you said that this was excusable because Royal Bank of Scotland was a sophisticated group with a strong governance culture. I don't think anybody in the United Kingdom believes that of the Royal Bank of Scotland. Record losses ... a bailout by the British Government and a chief...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you very much, Chairman, and I echo your welcome to our two ex-governors this morning. Mr. Burrows, let me start with you. Mr. Crowley in his statement said "In particular, I do not recall any issues of imprudent lending being brought to a Board by the Executives of the Bank, the internal auditors or the external auditors." Did that happen in your term as governor or would you make...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: And then the difficulties, if I may refer to ... BOI - B1, page 17.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman. It should come up on the screen in time. Yes, at paragraph 126 there.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: You have the advantage, mine hasn't appeared yet, never mind. "BOI's issues have revolved around:-[1] the absolute quantum of property lending on its balance sheet; [2] the greater dependence on wholesale markets rather than deposit gathering; [3] the structural defects in financing of mortgage markets leading to greater reliance on securitisation; [4] ... [is] ... entering ... some...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: But were there not alarm bells in the bank that ... as you said in the introduction, that a bank which had been around since 1783 got into these difficulties against all its traditions of ... of conservative banking?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Was the strategy a cause of the subsequent problems? And I have in mind what was perceived as the undermining of the local bank manager who knew his customers, who knew the society, and who had a strong record of solvency, being replaced by the next generation, which brought the bank to Government Buildings and needing a rescue, as you said.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: And, you know, did that perceived change lead to the problems later?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you. I might put one question to Mr. Crowley. And this is core document B2, pages 37-47, Mr. Crowley, and they'll come up in a while. This was a board decision to allow ... to move the earnings multiplier allowing customers to borrow up to 4.5 times their annual income and also to increase the loan-to-value threshold and was made in 2002. Why did the board do that, Mr. Crowley?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Then the next one, if I may, the same volume, pages 63-67, where it states that residential investment property, RIP, lending doubled within Bank of Ireland over 15 months from 2003 to September 2004, and over the next few years there was a relaxation of terms and conditions. Was the risk in doing that understood by the board at the time, given what we said about ... that the first reason...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: You ... residential investment property lending doubled in a 15-month period and property is, in the previous quotation, the first reason why Bank of Ireland got into trouble. So did the board understand the risk when it doubled residential investment property lending in such a short period?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Would there be nervousness ... as some of the expert witnesses have said here, if anything grows really quickly in banking by huge percentages - 100% in this case - in a short period, there should be alarm bells? It's a bad sign for a bank if it makes these explosive decisions.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Sean Barrett: Were you ever worried if an item grew by 100% in 15 months?