Results 2,781-2,800 of 6,295 for speaker:Michael D'Arcy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Okay. You said in evidence this morning-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Sorry?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: You said in evidence this morning that when you went into a Deportment you'd source ... to try and source the best people.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Who was the best person in the Department of Finance in relation to banking?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Kevin Cardiff. You valued his opinion.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Okay. Mr. Cowen, were you aware that the market analysis in relation to some of the Irish banks, not all of them, at the end of '07, early '08, was that the difficulty ... that their loan book was substantially impaired or would be substantially impaired?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: In the period that we're discussing this afternoon, Mr. Cowen, up as far as the time you became Taoiseach, did you believe that Anglo Irish Bank was systemic to the Irish banking system prior to your elevation to the office of Taoiseach?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: RBS offered an advice note in late 2007 stating that Anglo Irish Bank with only ... with no banking network structure, with no ATM's, with a small number of actual clients, that it was not systemic to the Irish banking system.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Okay. If I could just go back to some of the evidence form yesterday, Mr. Cowen, please. You said that ... from your own evidence today, you said in budget '06 there was a cost-benefit analysis done in relation to the tax incentive schemes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: In evidence yesterday, Mr. Donal McNally ... he was a ... an official within the Department - you know Donal - stated that the SSIA scheme ... that there was no analysis prepared by the Department in relation to that. That was passed to you subsequently when you became Minister for Finance. There was a bill of €2.5 billion for the Exchequer over the period. Would...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Cowen, you're welcome. Mr. Cowen, you've mentioned on numerous occasions today about the PwC analysis that occurred subsequent to the guarantee. That's Project Atlas. Were you aware that the PwC work took the valuations that the banks had and found the result that the banks were solvent based upon the banks' valuations?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Peter Bacon, when he provided evidence before us, said that his figures were that there would be a €35 billion impairment on the banks' balance sheets. Now, the numbers turned out to be €42 billion. Were you surprised at those levels of impairment? Was that the first occasion-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Cowen, you said earlier that the market sentiment had to be addressed prior to the night of the guarantee. And I'm quoting Department of Finance booklet Vol. 2. I'm not sure if that booklet was made available to Mr. Cowen but the, it's the memorandum from Merrill Lynch, it's page 113, dated 28 September 2008. And the second last paragraph, the last line of that and it states, "The...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask, Mr. Cowen, how the authorities ... I'm talking about the Central Bank, the Financial Regulator and the Civil Service also, as well as the body, as well as the Government ... were unaware and yet the market sentiment was very clear and was very clear from a long period of time?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask you, Mr. Cowen, if you scroll ... if you turn to the next page of that document please, half way down, last paragraph before summary description. And Merrill Lynch say, "It is clear that certain lowly rated monoline banking models around the world, were there is concentration on a single asset class (such as commercial property) are likely to be unviable as wholesale markets stay...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Even with that statement there from Merrill Lynch?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask your view in relation to INBS attempts to gather deposits in the UK? I'm talking specifically about Michael Fingleton Jr., when he ... people used the term ... "abused" the Government guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Yes. Can I ask, Mr. Cowen, and I understand Cabinet confidentiality may apply here, but your decision to increase the deposit guarantee scheme from €20,000 to €100,000 was higher than a lot of other jurisdictions. Could you give me, and give the committee the analysis that was undertaken to arrive at that decision and who took that analysis on your behalf?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask, Mr. Cowen, that in terms of the amount there was now a €70 billion liability from ... I'm not sure what the liability was at €20,000 per deposit, but was there overkill? Did we all ... did the system or people working the system try to do too much rather than doing enough?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: And similar back to the night of the Guarantee also.