Results 2,761-2,780 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: Because some people might say that when that was the system that banks were solvent and that the managerial reorganisation, integrations and transfers of functions, lost the connection between the manager and what risks were worthwhile in the local community and which ones were not.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: Thank you very much. And thank you, Chairman.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman, and ... the link with the Royal Bank of Scotland, you know, which had to be bailed out for £46 billion and in 2008 lost £24.1 billion, the largest annual loss in UK corporate history, that was unfortunate for Ireland that that kind of a bank was also trading here, wasn't it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: Mr. Goodwin's pension was reduced from £550,000 to £342,500 in 2009. Were those kind of pensions paid in Ireland?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: The reduction of the pension by 38%, did something similar happen to executives in the Ulster Bank?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: Were there any reductions?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: Were there any pay reductions?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: Could I draw attention to the letters from the regulator, UBI - B2, pages 26 afterwards. You were saying to Senator O'Keeffe that lots of banks got these kinds of letters, but I have to point out for the record that there are two recommendations which are general findings and there are five more which are specific to Ulster Bank. In fact, they're called on page 26 Ulster Bank IL -"Specific...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: You say on page 10 of your statement there was no apparent deterioration of the performance of the Ulster Bank group loan portfolio, but £14.9 million sterling had to be put into that, was ... so that was the deterioration that took place.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: The numbers you have on page 4, and discussed with Deputy Higgins, your advance is growing at 172% over four years, or second only to Anglo at 265% over four years, which was a major ingredient in the property bubble.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: You come in No. 2.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: Now, you spoke earlier ... my final question, on branch banking, but on page 7 of your statement it says: "Ulster Bank branches held no lending authority and everything was transferred to Credit", with a capital C. Now, you were defending the local branch bank manager earlier, but it looks like, by what you said on page 7, that the powers were being transferred away.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: On HERMES to model property, there is no financial sector in HERMES, the ESRI economic model.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: Thank you. Thanks Chairman.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman, and welcome back to our visitors this morning. Could I refer to core document UBI-B2C, Vol. 2, pages 19 to 30, and, in particular, page 27 stress testing. The worst case scenario... You tell me when you're ready. Do you need the referencing again?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: Certainly. UBI-B2C, Vol. 2, pages 19 to 30, and, in particular, page 27. Chairman, there was a worst case scenario in stress testing. Residential property prices were forecast to fall by 30% between 2008 to 2009, and commercial property prices were forecast to fall by 40%. That would result in a total impairment charge of €540 million. The actual impairment charge for UBIL was...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: Indeed.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: I will address Mr. Gallagher, if I may? On the core documents, B2, pages 24 to 29, a letter from the Financial Regulator to UBIL, dated 12 March. He was ... the Financial Regulator was concerned regarding the effectiveness of UBIL's credit review process as it related to commercial property lending. Do our visitors think that UBIL had a sufficiently robust and effective credit approval and...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: I just want to, Mr Torpey, arising from his presentation today, Chairman. On page 6, you say that the treasury was transferred to Royal Bank of Scotland. On page 7, accounting functions, accounts production, regulatory reporting and accounts payable were transferred. Yesterday Mr. McCarthy said on his page 7 that Ulster Bank branches had no lending authority and everything was referred to...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Sean Barrett: Now you referred earlier, I think it's in response to Deputy Phelan, about the compliance culture of the Royal Bank of Scotland. I have many constituents, the nature of my constituency in the United Kingdom, and I think I'd have to say that compliance and the Royal Bank of Scotland don't actually go well in the same sentence. Record fines for anti-competitive practices on 20/1/ 2011. In...