Results 2,681-2,700 of 4,414 for speaker:Sean Barrett
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you, Chairman. AIB B2, Vol. 1 and it's page 21.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: And ... and it had just three people in what seems a major part of the Irish economy, particularly in the Celtic tiger era, and they ... what your internal auditor said, "This could lead to the bank missing significant credit events on accounts and the subsequent financial loss".
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Yes, the page number in the booklet is 21, Chairman.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: And it's AIB B2, and I hope I've ... I've described that accurately, or correctly.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: GGG01600 type: 1 --> Credit Support, that's the one, Mr. Duffy, yes. Was that a problem that was encountered?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: There seemed to be a shortage of staff in Galway, and you spoke earlier about the change in corporate culture. Well, to the outsider, it seemed that up and down the country, management was ... the bank manager, who was an important figure in towns and cities, that his powers were all transferred centrally. Have you gone back to the Galways and the Tralees, and so on?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Some commentators and I think some of the institutions didn't much like the Central Bank rules on deposits, but I take it from your evidence you're a supporter of that rule.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: How does your present regulation, SSM, work? Do you send data to them? Do they come to see you from time to time?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: The last one, if I may. The pillar bank, does that present the danger to the wider Irish economy of a duopoly between the two pillars?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Thank you Chairman and welcome Mr. Goggin.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: You said that when you discussed the 100% mortgages with the regulator in mid-2006, your proposal was a 90% one and that he said to you: ''It's not my job to intervene in markets''. I hope I got that-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Could you expand on that? How ... why did he not want to intervene? Was that not the function of a regulator in many ways?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: And were there other instances of that so called light-touch regulation' that you found in your discussions with the regulator?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: And did the regulator come to the bank or did you go to see him?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: And after the introduction of the euro, did the regulation in any way move from Ireland to Frankfurt?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: So did you ever meet any officials from the ECB?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: So it was networking rather than regulation.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: And Mr. Trichet was presiding?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Sean Barrett: Was there concern about ... you mentioned about the level of wholesale borrowing, although you're fairly at ease with it. Other economists would be worried that it was a source of instability because those said funds can flow away. Was there concern that the way the euro was designed could bring down banks in small countries with those massive flows in and out?