Results 2,401-2,420 of 6,295 for speaker:Michael D'Arcy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: -----went from being low debt-to-GDP ratio-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: -----to the highest in Europe?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: And should action have been taken to prevent that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Again this morning I put to Mr. O'Reilly, Mr. Patterson, that principles-based regulation in this jurisdiction was similar to principles-based regulation in other jurisdictions. And yet our crash in the banking sector was 40% of GPD, a multiple times that of other countries. Can you explain how we were so much worse than other jurisdictions with the same principles-based regulation?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: And what brought down our banking sector? What was the primary reason?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Just going back to Nyberg report: willingness and ability to act, to take action. Do you believe there were effective tools, instruments available to deal with the excessive credit growth and sector risk concentration, and can you assess the use and the efficacy of these instruments?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Considine, you're welcome. I want to start with the Wright report, Mr. Considine, please, on page 22, section 3.2.5, there's a diagram, you've probably seen it, I'm sure you've seen it.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Effectively, it's the starting position with the Department in relation to the budgetary expenditure and then the final position. When Mr. Wright was before us, we discussed this. Can I ask your view about that particular diagram in that era?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: The report ... the report says, "We examined why relatively prudent fiscal advice in June was systematically ignored in the Budget process." Now, you've mentioned the politicians on a number of occasions. Were you, as an individual, as perhaps the leading civil servant in the State, as a Secretary General, Department of Finance, were you strong enough with your Minister?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: I'm asking ... for your years.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Sorry, the Wright report says it was.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Yes ... systematically.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Were you strong enough?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Did you ... did you see the section when Mr. Wright was before us? Did you see his presentation?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Yes. One of the lines that he did use was, he would have pressed the red button.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Yes. Would ... would you ... why did you not press the red button?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Okay. I'll move on, Chairman. You were a member of the CBFSAI board?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Okay. Why did the board and the Department accept the soft landing scenario?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Considine, in the Honohan report, on page 84, under section 6.17, he points out that the FSR cites no quantitative analytical evidence for the conclusion of a soft landing. You say there is from other sectors?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: We'll move on then to the FSR reports and during your period there was an ... Deputy Higgins discussed the growth of the balance sheets. But the growth in personal indebtedness went from 71% in 1995 to ... of GDP to 248% projected in the final 2007 FSR report. The vast majority of that happened on your watch, from '02 to '06, where they passed the European average and then went from the...