Results 2,321-2,340 of 6,295 for speaker:Michael D'Arcy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: -----and that it was commercial-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: -----commercial property that eventually ... and if it was a standard bubble and you had awareness of it, why was there not reports conducted previously in terms of the commercial sector which was the sector that eventually broke the Irish banks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Sorry-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Why then, you as the most senior economist, within the Central Bank, did you not insist that it is the commercial real estate sector that is the more dangerous of the two sectors? And that went unchecked until 2006.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Perhaps if you could provide those documents as well in relation to the ... for the committee, it would be helpful.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Could I just move on, please? You were a member of the domestic standing group on behalf of the Central Bank.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: The simulations ... the simulation of the exercise in light of the crisis that eventually emerged, there were two standards applied, a stress test and a higher stress test. Were you ... were you consulted in relation to the simulation exercise by the domestic standing group?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask you ... a term that you used earlier with me was "horrendous and unsustainable". Why was there not a much, much higher - potentially a doomsday scenario - stress test if you knew that the growth of the balance sheet was horrendous, unsustainable ... why would you just have a standard stress test and then a higher stress test?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. O'Connell, can I just-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: -----can I just hold you there, please, for a moment? You've presented evidence here that ... the term you used was "horrendous", "unsustainable," and yet if the ... if a much higher - potential doomsday - stress test had been implemented, potentially the decisions made by others coming closer to the guarantee might have been different if a much higher stress test had been applied, much higher.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: I'd prefer if you'd stay with the-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: -----please.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Could a different decision have been arrived at?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Were yours on the back of an envelope?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Things were going bananas. Why then would ... was you ... would ... did you not, as a member of the domestic standing group, not insist, as potentially the most senior non-academic economist in the State ... certainly as the senior economist within Central Bank ... why did you not insist on a much, much more rigorous stress test?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: I know. I'm not-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: I was asking about the domestic standing group, yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Thank you, Chair. If I could start, Mr. O'Reilly ... the memorandum between the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator dealt with responsibilities of the CBFSAI and IFSRA. Was there clarity in what should be dealt with by you, as the regulator?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: And, with the clear analysis of each person's roles, was there any crossover or should there have been any crossover in a formal or an informal manner?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. O'Reilly, on Vol. 2 of your documents, page 44, the Nyberg report-----