Results 2,301-2,320 of 6,295 for speaker:Michael D'Arcy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Thank you, Chairman. Mr. O'Connell, on page 4 of your written statement, you state, about halfway down through the second paragraph: Around that time, a memo was sent from the economics function in the bank to the then Governor recommending that bank lending to the property sector needed to be reined in; for many years in the past the Central Bank imposed credit ceilings on banks in the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Yes. Could I just ask-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Okay, sorry.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Yes. In your statement, you suggest that the authorities were well aware of the dangerous developing situation in terms of the property bubble. When did you realise that there was a bubble forming? When did it start in your own mind?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: And, tell me, when did you believe that it moved on from an ordinary property bubble to a very serious, significant property bubble; that it had become really excessive?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: I asked you when did it become really excessive?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: It was massively excessive around 2000. And what term would you use for the subsequent growth, as we've seen in previous evidence from AIB, Bank of Ireland and Anglo in the region of 30% per annum growth year-on-year compound-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: In the balance sheet, yes, of the banks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: I mean, in mind ... keeping in mind that you said in 2000 it was massively excessive.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Okay-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Excessive?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: What term would you use where ... where it eventually got to where it got to ... what ... what was ... what was the one term that you would use?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Those are the figures that we've quoted here.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: What term would you use for that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Horrendous, okay. And can ... what did you ... what was the role that you used? What was your role within the Central Bank as the most senior economist that straddled both the Central Bank and IFSRA in terms of what you did to prevent that year-on-year horrendous growth? Unsustainable, in your own terms.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Did you have access to the consolidated data?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Yes, and you made the point earlier to Deputy O'Doherty, I think it was, that the bubble was a standard bubble, same as previous bubbles.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: The bubble was a standard bubble-----