Results 2,181-2,200 of 6,295 for speaker:Michael D'Arcy

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask you, which was the bigger difficulty? Was it a bigger difficulty that financial broker firms had decided that the Irish banks were in serious trouble because of their loan book or the liquidity crisis? Which came first? Which was the biggest problem?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: You were the banking supervisor.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Which was the biggest issue? I suppose what I am saying is the liquidity crisis ... this is almost a year, it is ten months before the guarantee. The liquidity crisis, while there was contingency planning for events, this was the November 7th report from a major player in the international markets stating quite clearly a negative perspective on the Irish banking sector because of property...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: But it was available, liquidity was available.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Were they more exposed than anybody else?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Can I just conclude then, there was a financial stability report in November '07, which stated that the Irish citizens were indebted, now the most indebted people in Europe, up to 248% of GNP and they also stated the difficulty in relation to the CRE sector. Again, the coincidence of the FSR report, this report that you had sight of and a further ten months down the line. Did the banks'...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Was ours worse than anywhere else?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Just to finish-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: -----was ours worse than anywhere else?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: In terms of liquidity.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Ours wasn't?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Neary, you're very welcome.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Neary, given the extraordinary losses by Irish banks and financial institutions, did the Financial Regulator's office fail the people of Ireland?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask you, in your opening statement, where you outline where the Financial Regulator's office required higher ratios than were requested ... if we required higher ratios, how then was our crash so much worse than any other financial jurisdiction in Europe?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: In your response to the Chairman you said that the Financial Regulator's office, and this is your quote, were responsible for "financial soundness" of individual institutions.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: And in the ... in the years '01 to '08, in evidence on a number of occasions, the figures that we have quoted to witnesses in relation to the growth of AIB was 30% year-on-year increase, compound, Bank of Ireland, 29% year-on-year increase, compound, Anglo had a similar rate of growth. Why wasn't action taken to slow down the growth of the property bubble earlier, especially in the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Sorry. Can you just clarify that for me, Mr. Neary, please? You're saying that your role was the financial soundness of the institution. But you felt - the regulator's office, not you individually - that the growth rate was too high. It wasn't for you to tell, or raise the matter with, the Central Bank. It was a matter, via guidance of section 33D, that they raise it with you. Is that...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: If you could clarify that, please, because-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Yes.