Results 2,081-2,100 of 6,295 for speaker:Michael D'Arcy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: And, specifically, I'm talking about senior executives from the financial institutions - AIB, Bank of Ireland, Ulster Bank - that have before ... appeared before us previously. And one of the themes that has ran through that, Mr. Hurley ... one of the major issues was that the banks did not have access to consolidated data in relation to developers, to major projects or, in particular, to...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Hurley, I have read the financial stability reports and I will come back to them in a moment. One of the criticisms was that the banks were unaware that certain people who they had lent money to also had a cross-collateralisation, a cross-securitisation of loans with another bank and each bank was unaware that that other ... that same individual was indebted to another institution. On...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: While the functions were divested to the Financial Regulator, your role, as we’ve stated at the very start, was to oversee the financial stability of the entire sector.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: On any occasion, did you request from IFSRA the top ten exposures, analysing the risk that the financial stability reports ... that you’ve stated in the FSR reports, was any of that analysis done in relation to the commercial real estate sector?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: But you had authority over the financial stability of the entire sector. What I’m trying to scope, Mr. Hurley, is you had access to the consolidated data, in particular for the commercial real estate sector, and I’m trying to scope did you request that data, did you analyse that data of the top ten exposures within each financial institution to protect the stability of the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Should they have?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: With hindsight, should they have? With the benefit of hindsight?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Hurley, the credit sector concentrations and prudent underwriting standards in the banks were also important to financial stability. Do you believe there was adequate discussion of the breaches of lending policies and sector risk concentration and limits at board meetings of the CBFSAI?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Did you respect it too much? Should you have delved further?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: The policy tools that were available ... the effective instruments available to deal with the excessive credit growth and the sector risk concentration, can you access the use ... and the use of these instruments?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: The policy tools, the quantitative controls, qualitative controls ... that you could have ... the Central Bank could have requested to be used, I assume via the Financial Regulator.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: The Central Bank-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: No, I'm not ... I'm sorry, I'm not talking about the compiling of a financial stability report. What I'm asking about, the powers that were available to you and I quote document Vol. 1 ... Vol. 1. of the core documents, page 3, from the letter from the current Governor of the Central Bank, Professor Honohan, that there were powers available and tools available to the Central Bank Governor,...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: With hindsight, should you have?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: You knew the risks-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: You knew the risks, you itemised the risks in the financial stability reports from '04, '05, '06 and '07. But you ... what you said was you did not foresee ... sorry ... "The Bank emphasized downside risks to the banking sector but it did not foresee the dramatic consequences that flowed from the interaction of the international financial crisis with our domestic vulnerabilities." The...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: In conversation with the Financial Regulator's office, you said you worked well together.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Were you aware that the overall financial stability of the entire sector was at risk?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ... in Vol. 1, from page 134 onwards where the FSR reports are available, so these are public documents they're not protected by section 33AK-----