Results 20,721-20,740 of 27,019 for speaker:Michael Noonan

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: I was-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: I was surprised because I hadn't-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: I ... I ... there is ... what I said was ... to Deputy Higgins was I was surprised because it was unexpected. I had been figuring out how the conversation might go. I knew it was going to be a difficult conversation and the mention of the Irish financial services was unexpected. I did ... I hadn't reckoned that this would be mentioned, you know. I hadn't included it in the Government...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: I don't think so because if there was-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: If there was, it would have been in the ... it would have been in a memorandum if the advice was given. It would be an important-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: I discussed it later on.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: Well, I mean, they said, "You never know but if you default, there has ... there are unforeseen consequences which ...". I mean, I didn't need advice to tell me that. Once he mentioned it, I said, "You know, if you're trying to put pressure on me, you have come up with a good one", you know.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: Well, that was my first engagement with him on the burning of bondholders because, as was pointed out earlier, I took up office on 9 March and this was 31 March, so it wasn't a long lead-in time. I knew who he was but I hadn't met him previously. I think there was a meeting in Brussels where I would have met him.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: I met him subsequently on several occasions, I had different agendas to run. I was trying to get him to move on the promissory note. I was trying to get him to agree to increasing maturities on the official lending. I was trying to get him to take out the moral hazard imposition that put a premium on-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: No, I didn’t revisit it after that.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: Because I was ... now had moved my negotiation on to changing the promissory note and, as part of the promissory note, the bondholder issue was still in there. I hadn’t conceded ... I never agreed with Trichet. I never agreed with Trichet. I never told Trichet we wouldn’t go ahead. What we did was I made a statement in the Dáil and that was that we weren’t...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: No. The conversations I had with the Commission and with the ECB and with the IMF after that was that we could not continue paying €3.1 billion every March to service a promissory note arrangement-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: -----and that we needed it restructured, and that as part of the restructuring the issue of senior bondholders would have to be revisited.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: Yes, I read the comments made by Mr. Aynsley in the newspapers. I didn’t know what he was talking about. It sounded like dúirt bean liom go ndúirt bean léi to me.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: I mean, as I read it, it was that an official had a ... produced a minute of a conversation he had with an official in Finance who related to him that he had a view about something and that the Minister would support this view. I mean, I have no idea what the basis for that was. But certainly my view was that assets should have been sold all the way across the banking system for the highest...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: You started as Gaeilge so I thought I’d complement it by having something as Gaeilge myself.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: I don’t agree with the evidence that was given but I have never seen this e-mail or nobody has given me a copy of the e-mail and I don’t know what basis there is for it. But there’s a commission of inquiry to examine all these issues and let the commission of inquiry deal with it.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: I’m afraid I can’t help you on this.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: It has nothing to do with me, I can assure you of that.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Sep 2015)

Michael Noonan: This is the issue that when every secured creditor is repaid by the liquidators the residue will go to the unsecured creditors. And there is a hierarchy of unsecured creditors with subordinate bondholders towards the end of the line and if the surplus is sufficiently large some subordinate bondholders may benefit from the proceeds of the liquidation. Under law, as it stands at the moment,...