Results 17,481-17,500 of 26,097 for speaker:Kieran O'Donnell
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: The fact, Mr. Fitzpatrick, that it was so significant right, why didn't you draw attention to it in your audit report by way of an emphasis a matter, not strictly speaking a qualification?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Looking back, the fact that €13 billion of, effectively from RBS went into Ulster Bank Ireland. On reflection, what would you feel about not qualifying the reports in any shape or form on the valuation?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: On IAS 39, can you just confirm ... clarify to me that the valuation basis for looking at impaired loans. Am I correct in saying that the way you valued the loans was based on looking at any loss would be a measure between the difference between what the asset was being carried at on the balance sheet of the bank and the net present value of the cash flow from the loans? So, I suppose the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Well, the provision you provided, which was €304 million of impairment for 2008, surely that was grossly inadequate?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: But you've signed off on the provisions.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: No, no I'm asking you ... surely with the valuation basis under IAS 39, that you look at the difference, you're looking at the future cash flows from loans. So it's not strictly correct to say you do not book losses until they're realised. The valuation method under IAS 39 is based on future cash flows that come in from the loans and to evaluate those, and I'm saying against the market of...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: It's still very low as a percentage of the overall.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: The question I'm really asking Mr. Fitzpatrick, am I correct in saying is the IAS 39 is not strictly about showing the loss when you realise or sell the asset? It's actually about looking at the future cash flows from a loan. And the point I'm making here is, on that basis, surely the provisioning should have been higher by the banks and, consequently, the audit report should have reflected...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: In hindsight, Mr. Fitzpatrick, looking back now, would you have done anything differently in terms of, particularly the audit of the '08 accounts?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Mr. Torpey, would you accept that the arrears that have arisen since the ... those 100% mortgages came in, have proven to be far higher than the arrears on mortgages issued prior to that date?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: But in your role in banking within the Department of Finance and the NTMA, you would have had access to that information.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Mr. Torpey, what's your current view on the appropriateness of the bank guarantee that was put in place on that fateful night in September 2008?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: My line of questioning, Chairman, revolves around ... that you were group financial director with Ulster Bank up to the end of '07, which is a relatively short period of time before the guarantee was put in place. So, it's more in terms of your perspective on the state of the banking system, the liquidity in the market, solvency in the market and did ... the actual ... the type of guarantee...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: How did the liquidity squeeze manifest itself in terms of the running of Ulster Bank, of which you were group finance director?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: When you say ... you might elaborate on that. What do you mean by certain planned transactions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And was it affecting your day to day business in terms of access to liquidity to do your day-to-day business as a bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: But was there issues for Ulster Bank Ireland itself? Did you ... were there times where you were not able to raise it through the normal interbank market in a normal way ... that you had to -----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Okay. Can I ask you one quick question, Mr. Torpey.? The issue you spoke about ... the accounting standards, if you had wished, could you have put a note to the financial statements as distinct from ... could you ... a provisioning, could you have put a note to the financial statements that you needed to provide a potential contingent liability in terms of reduction in the, we'll say, in...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And finally, Mr. Torpey, why did you leave Ulster Bank at the end of 2010?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Sorry, the end of 2007.