Results 23,441-23,460 of 35,959 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay and what impact did that have in relation to the bank as to how they then progressed from there?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, can I move on to another-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: You go on to talk about your astonishment at ... another key point was the bilateral sales arrangement that the Department of Finance wanted you to engage on, something that you had previously embargoed in favour of open sales that were transparent, arm's-length and fully valued. Can you inform the committee again, without any details or any specific case, did such bilateral sale...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, so if it were-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. So if there were, as you've said ... you did engage in bilateral sale arrangements, then why are you so astonished at the fact that the Department of Finance was asking you to enter into bilateral sales agreements and how do you say that the bank had embargoed them, given what you're just after telling us?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And was the Department of Finance wanting you to do that at a massive level?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. You talk on page 8 of your statement about the sale in July 2011 of a large part of Anglo's US portfolio-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----a sale that you describe as, quote, "sub-optimal" in terms of recovery levels and one that would not have been undertaken by the bank, and to quote you again "without ministerial instruction". Mr. Aynsley, are you saying, or not, in your statement, that the sub-optimal sale of Anglo's US assets in July 2011 was done under ministerial instruction?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: What was your understanding of the reasons behind this sub-optimal sale?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And did you put up an argument with the Department in relation to what-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Were you able to put a potential value ... a potential amount on the loss to the bank if it were ... if it was sold at that period of time? Did you have a value on it?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: What was the loss you believed by selling it early, as was instructed?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Was it less than €100 million? Was it well in excess of that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: No, I was just looking for a range as a-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: In your witness statement, you note that in 2009, as part of the overall asset quality review, there was a need to repair and perfection of documentation and security. Can you briefly give us some idea as to the nature, extent of the repair and perfection exercise required?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Can I ask you - and it was touched on earlier - in terms of the management team in Anglo challenging any of the asset valuations ascribed by NAMA which resulted in the loss of €21 billion on sale or on transfer? Can you talk to me? Did you challenge them and why did you challenge them? What's your view on that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Mr. Aynsley, we've had a number of Anglo's biggest borrowers before the committee giving evidence. We've heard from Sean Mulryan and Joe O'Reilly. Both of them, in their evidence, said that they intend fully paying back everything as Anglo's debts are being recovered. Were the NAMA write-downs, in your view, given that they're-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: They both stated that they expect to pay back all of their loans, all of their NAMA loans, and they were the two of the largest borrowers with ... they were in the top category in terms of borrowing for Anglo. Given that we've heard from two of those, and it is only two, and they say that they will back everything, was the write-downs from NAMA justified? Could Anglo Irish Bank have dealt...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat. Mr. Aynsley, I want to refer to page 14 of your statement that you've furnished to the committee. And this is where you address the accusations that ... and allegations that have been made against you as CEO-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----that you had close relationships and provided private commitments to certain named key customers. Can I ask you did you ever provide private commitments to any customer of IBRC-Anglo Irish Bank?