Results 23,281-23,300 of 35,959 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. So ... okay, I'll leave it at that. Can I ask you, in the letter from INBS, and again this is in core booklet, Vol. 3, page 41? This is a letter from INBS to the Financial Regulator's office in April 2008 and it's in response to the Regulator's query of February 2008 - its report on commercial property lending. The letter from INBS states: Mr. Fingleton is closely involved with the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes. Mr. Fingleton, in the core booklet - again Vol. 1, page 71 to 73 - this is a review by Deloitte in the second quarter of 2008 into your bank, Irish Nationwide, commercial and residential lending. It had the following to say with regard to critical issues. On page 71 of these documents it quotes: No Credit Committee approval was present on a number of reviewed files, mostly relating...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, that's fine. Just for clarity, you are disputing the Deloitte report, the Financial Regulator's report, Project Harmony's report in relation to-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----Deloitte's report, the Financial Regulator's letters in relation to your authority and the Project Harmony report? It's that just for accuracy purposes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Can I finally ask you ... in relation to ... INBS's overarching driver was demutualisation and sale and this is talked about in the Nyberg report. In your opinion, did the desire on the part of management, and on your part also as part of that management, to maximise the value of INBS result in the adoption of poor lending practice and an increased level of risk in the loan portfolio?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The question is: did the fact that you wanted to sell ... the demutualisation and sale, did that result in your view, as part of the management to maximise the value of INBS ... did that result in the adoption of poor lending practices and an increase in the level of risk in the loan portfolio?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat. Can you put that last document that you had on the ... on the screen in terms of the internal audit that the Chairperson was just talking to you, the findings? Do you accept the findings from the internal audit?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Do you, sorry, there's three significant witnesses-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, no, that's fine-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----we're under the clock. Point 3 there, which is ... a loan for €10 million was advanced without sufficient back-up documentation and without receiving credit committee approval, do you accept that finding? This is an internal audit department review.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So the internal audit department makes-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----the internal audit department makes that as a significant weakness. The Deloitte ... in the Deloitte report they have ... on page 74 they talk about a loan amount of ... a loan amount was increased by £10 million sterling from £71 million to £81 million with the approval of the manage ... managing director, with only an accompanying memo stating that the £10,125,000...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Mr. Fingleton, you were given what some have called excessive powers going back to, what, 1994. And, again, in August 1997, in ... an extract from the board minutes say that the ... they are to include the powers to set, vary and alter its interest rates, fees, terms and conditions of all loans, whether secured or unsecured, and on all investment and deposit accounts. It goes on to...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But you ... can I clarify ... can I clarify this because the question was put to you by a number of my colleagues on a number of occasions in terms of did you issue a loan without the approval of the board or the credit committee and to my knowledge you've responded to say that you've ... you've only ever done so with the-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----let me finish, this is an important point-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----you've only ever done so with the approval of the board's policy. But is it not the case, as far back as 1994, you had that authority yourself to actually do this, to vary loans, to change interest rates, to create extensions - that you were acting within the policy of the board-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----but you could do it solely yourself-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----as an individual?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: You, there was a review-----