Results 23,201-23,220 of 35,959 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes, it's Vol. 2. On 22 November, Peter Fitzpatrick stated, "To quote Schroders in the UK, who met with [Bank of Ireland] yesterday, the CEO said that "in quarter one the issue for all Irish banks was one of survival"." Can you expand on this comment that's made in this e-mail, that as early as to November 2007 they're suggesting that the Irish banks' survival is the key issue for the next...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Do you share the view that, at that point, there was an issue in terms of the Irish banks' survival?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: That it was that serious or it was getting that serious?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The e-mail also talks about the fall in stock prices and at the end there, the second last paragraph, the two lines, says, "Another reason for the stock prices going off is another round of margin calls in the remaining [contract for difference] market. I am told that this is all done and dusted now and that a good number of previously wealthy folk have lost their shirts in [contract for...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: We've heard about this short-selling and, you know, and it's in this e-mail as well. And we had the Government instigating ... or in ... the Central Bank instigating an inquiry in relation to Anglo. But isn't it not the case that the actual short-selling of stocks and the banks that they were short-selling - if they were short-selling - if they were spreading the rumours then to benefit...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Short-selling is a normal practice, although it was banned, but it was a normal practice and a legitimate practice. The issue here, and it is referred in the e-mail, is that people would have been involved in short-selling and would spread what would be viewed by some as malicious rumours in relation to events.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Short, yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. In terms of the pre-crash period, when did you begin to notice that something was up with the capital markets?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And what was the perception of Irish financial institutions during that period, 2007 going up to 2008? What were they saying to you? Like, you were on the end of the phone to them, you were meeting with them, they were telling you what they thought of the banks, what they thought of your bank.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Well, the markets, the funds.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But the lenders to your institution, what were they saying? What was the perception of the markets in relation to Irish financial institutions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Of the Irish banks.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The question is, what was the market perception at that time? So, you say that about mid-2007, you felt that something was up with the markets, obviously.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: What was the perception? What were people saying? What were traders saying to you, people that would normally lend to banks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: From your day-to-day dealings with the capital markets, was there any distinction being made between various financial institutions or various Irish financial institutions or were they all being treated as a block?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. In the deals that you were making, you were carrying out, was there no conversations in relation to how they perceived your bank via Anglo, via Bank of Ireland, via AIB? You know, was there none of that conversation going on?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: One of the things, one of the issues we have come across in the banking inquiry is this quote about "No Dublin trades", with a suggestion basically that Ireland was being locked out of the capital markets, that this was a direction that was given. Did you ever come across any evidence of a blanket block on deals with Irish banks? Did you ever hear any sense of that "No Dublin trades" in the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. So you have, kind of, no specifics of any conversations whatsoever. Like, you know, I'm looking ... I'll go back to the e-mail that we were referring to there. Again, on page 11 - and we have this as documentary evidence - where it talks about, "One of our Canadian Holders said that she has been informed out of London that we [ILP] in Irish Life and Permanent are the next Northern...