Brendan Howlin (Wexford, Labour) | Oireachtas source

The second amendment to the amendment would amend section 19(1) of the 1956 Act by deleting the ground for revocation of citizenship provided for in paragraph (e) of the subsection. That ground is that a person to whom citizenship was granted has by a voluntary act other than marriage or civil partnership acquired another citizenship. This ground reinforces the notion we have two classes of Irish citizen and naturalised citizens are separate, distinct and unequal to those of us born in this country and citizens by birth. The Leas-Cheann Comhairle or I could go on to become dual citizens. We could acquire dual, triple or quadruple citizenship if we like. Irish law has no objection to that so long as the entitlement is exercised by a natural born citizen. However, according to paragraph (e), if a naturalised citizen acquires another citizenship, the Minister can retaliate by revoking his or her Irish citizenship. I do not think there is a rationale for that and submit through the amendment to the amendment that the paragraph be repealed.

Our third amendment to the Minister's amendment is:

After subsection (1O) proposed to be inserted by section 3(b), to insert the following: “(1OA) In a case to which subsection (1)(b) applies, nothing in subsection (1O) relieves the Minister or the Committee of Inquiry, as the case may be, of the obligation to specify the overt act referred to in that paragraph.”.

This requires explanation. The Minister's amendment outlines a new procedure to be followed where it is proposed to revoke a person's Irish citizenship. The new procedure would be inserted into section 19 of the 1956 Act as subsections (1)(a) and (1)(p). It provides a citizen must be given some detail of the case against them so that according to subsection (1)(b) a notice of the Minister's intention to revoke must inform the person of the reasons for the opinion of the Minister; under subsection (1)(e), if the Minister makes a decision to revoke, the person must be informed of the reasons for the decision; and under subsection (1)(m), when a committee of inquiry decides to affirm the decision of the Minister, it must provide reasons for its decision.

The requirements to give reasons in these three stages are all made subject to an exception provided for in subsection (1O). By that subsection, the requirement to give reasons does not apply to either the Minister in her actions or the committee of inquiry where it considers specifying the reasons for the decision would be contrary to the interest of national security. That is what the Minister is proposing. Consider how to apply that exception to a case under section 19(1)(b) where it is alleged, for example, that a naturalised citizen "has, by any overt act, shown himself to have failed in his duty of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State". I emphasise the word "overt". It is the opposite of "covert". An overt act is done openly, publicly and in an obvious way. The Minister does not propose in any of her amendments to remove this test. The test permits her to move against a naturalised citizen on grounds of disloyalty by reference to the overt acts of the citizen.

This may be an inappropriate test. If so, the Minister should amend it but she has chosen not to do so. As matters stand, the Minister can only move against a citizen on the basis of a citizen's non-covert act. It must be done in public and visible. If that is all she can take into account, on what possible basis could she plead national security as a grounds for not giving a reason for her decision? National security cannot be a ground for cloaking decision-making in secrecy if the decision itself is only made on an act which, by definition, must be open and publicly known. I hope I am making my point clearly. The national security override might be understandable, although it would be controversial and debatable, if the Minister was entitled to proceed against a naturalised citizen as a result of evidence obtained by surveillance or surreptitious activities, but section 19 as presented to the House does not permit that. It restricts the Minister to dealing with revocation only by judgment of overt acts. Our amendment is based on a recognition of that reality. It provides that in a case where a citizen is accused of disloyalty based on his or her overt acts, as the Minister has determined, the national security override will not apply and the Minister will remain obliged to give reasons for the decision.

I now propose to deal with the proposed fourth amendment to the Minister's amendment No. 3. Amendment No. 4 to amendment No. 3 reads as follows:

After subsection (1P) proposed to be inserted by section 3(b), to insert the following: “(1Q) In a case to which subsection (1) (b) applies, the Minister shall not decide to revoke a certificate of naturalisation, and the Committee of Inquiry shall not affirm such a decision unless the Minister or the Committee of Inquiry, as the case may be, is satisfied that the overt act concerned is so serious in nature that it shows that the obligations of citizenship have intentionally been abandoned.”

As I said, this is the fourth and final amendment to the Minister's very impactive amendment No. 3. It relates, as do all previous amendments, to section 19(1)(b) of the 1956 Act, which is the provision that entitles the Minister to revoke citizenship when satisfied that a person to whom it was granted, by an overt act, has shown himself or herself to have failed in his or her duty of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State. Our amendment is designed to strengthen the test involved in any such revocation, although we have reservations about whether it should be retained at all. However, this particular miscellaneous provisions legislation, this catch-all Bill is probably not the appropriate vehicle for debating first principles of citizenship law. Our amendment seeks to make it clear that the overt act concerned must be so serious in nature that it shows that the obligations of citizenship have intentionally been abandoned by the citizen. The reasoning behind our amendment is clear, bearing in mind that we, as native-born citizens, can break all manner of criminal or civil law and face the consequences of the courts, imprisonment or fines but not the drastic consequence that could be faced by a naturalised citizen of having citizenship revoked. A naturalised citizen should not be relegated to a contingent, second-class form of citizenship whereby he or she can have citizenship revoked for any reason short of behaviour that it amounts to an effective renunciation of citizenship. That is our contention.

I am sorry to have been so long-winded about these amendments but these are fundamental and serious matters that are, quite frankly, inappropriately dealt with in this short debate on a recommital motion on matters that have not been debatedvis-à-visfirst principles on Second Stage. I ask the Minister to progress very cautiously. The matters we have talked about as they relate to revocation of citizenship have already been dealt with by the Supreme Court. The judgments that we have had legal advice on are very extensive. It is interesting that different majorities within the Supreme Court of seven who looked at the Damache case came to different conclusions. It is a very stark warning to this Oireachtas to progress on this matter with great care, such is the fundamental importance of a person's citizenship.

See this speech in context