Cathal Berry (Kildare South, Independent) | Oireachtas source

I will speak on my amendment No. 8 and in support of Deputies Cronin and Howlin. First, there is a lot of good stuff in this Bill, but this is a lightning rod for any discontent. I think we all welcome true, independent oversight. It is a good model. I think everybody here wants this oversight body to be a success. We want it to not only be a success but an exemplar of good governance. As Deputy Howlin pointed out, the Secretary General has an executive function in the defence apparatus. Mixing oversight and executive functioning or activity is generally not good practice, whether nationally or internationally. I have a few points to raise, which I do with full respect.

The Minister mentioned that he sought the advice of the Attorney General about some matters before the votes, which is completely appropriate. A former Attorney General, Senator Michael McDowell, attended one of the hearings. He thought the presence of the Secretary General on an oversight function was highly unusual. Obviously the Minister is not going to disclose what the Attorney General said to him. Could we clarify whether the formal advice of the Attorney General has been sought about the appropriateness or otherwise of this? That would be good to know.

The Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence and former Minister for Justice and Equality, Deputy Charles Flanagan, said at the committee hearing that it would have been unthinkable for him to put the Secretary General of the Department of Justice on the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission or the Garda board, for exactly the same reason of perceived or actual conflict of interest. The Minister said at the committee hearing that the independent review group, IRG, recommended this course of action. I accept that and agree. To counter that a little, it is the unanimous view of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, both in public and private, I believe, that that should not be the case. I know the IRG was established but I think the cross-party parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence would also have some weight in the decision-making process. I ask that our views be taken on board too.

The fourth point I want to raise relates to page 18, if the Minister has it in front of him. It is line 30, in subsection 2(d). It is explicit. It is about removing a member of the external oversight body, which would obviously only happen in extremis. Line 30 reads, "the member has a conflict of interest of such significance that he or she should cease to hold office". To me, it is a contradiction to have that on page 18 while, a few pages beforehand, we are creating this conflict of interest. It is unfair to put the holder of that appointment into that compromised position.

The last point I would raise is that there is an excellent pathway, which Deputy Stanton raised at the committee, where the Chief of Staff, the head service person in the Defence Forces, can engage with the external oversight body. Why can the same courtesy not be extended to the Secretary General? If it is good enough for our Chief of Staff, surely it would be good enough for the Secretary General? I understand why the Secretary General would want to interact with the board. It is the same reason the Chief of Staff would. The Secretary General's expertise can be used to assist the external oversight board by using this pathway rather than being an ex officio member.

Those are the points I have. Perhaps the Minister might be able to reflect on them. If no decision can be taken today, perhaps an amendment can be drafted in the Seanad.

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