Simon Coveney (Cork South Central, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

I propose to take Questions Nos. 76, 105 and 110 together.

As I stated when answering Question No. 72, the Naval Service, as the State's principal seagoing agency, is tasked with a variety of defence and other roles. While the main daily tasking of the Naval Service is to provide a fishery protection service in accordance with our obligations as an EU member state, it also carries out a number of other non-fisheries related tasks in tandem with maritime surveillance. The Air Corps maritime patrol squadron also supports this role by providing aerial assistance to the Naval Service in patrolling the Irish exclusive economic zone using the two CASA CN 235 maritime patrol aircraft, which are due to be replaced in 2023 with the expected delivery of two new C295 maritime patrol aircraft.

Following an extraordinary EU Energy Council meeting that took place last week to discuss the EU’s energy security in response to the attacks on Nord Stream 1 and 2, the Minister for the Environment, Climate and Communications sought support from my Department for additional measures that could be put in place by the Defence Forces to ensure that critical offshore infrastructure, including data cables, is protected. My officials and the Defence Forces have been engaging with the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications and while the Defence Forces have limited subsea capabilities, particularly in this specialist area, additional patrols and targeted surveillance of offshore infrastructure, including data cables, are being examined.

On the future development of subsea capabilities, the Commission on the Defence Forces report considered that a step-up to level of ambition 2 should seek to deliver enhancements of subsurface capabilities to monitor subsea cables, which the report specifically mentioned. The report states that to achieve this would mean the naval fleet should have enhanced air, surface and subsurface search capabilities, with the latter allowing the Naval Service to monitor activity in the vicinity of subsea cables. In order to achieve these desired capability effects associated with a move to level of ambition 2, specific recommendations made by the commission were accepted in principle by the Government when it published its high-level action plan.

We have a medium-term plan to invest in equipment that can increase our capacity in this space. In the meantime, I expect we will increase patrolling and surveillance by the Naval Service and the Air Corps in the areas concerned. We will continue to speak to the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, as well as the owners of the infrastructure, whether that is EirGrid or Gas Networks Ireland. It is important to say that, outside of the cables, all other gas pipeline infrastructure is embedded in concrete under the seabed so it is quite well protected in the first place, but this matter is clearly of concern because of what happened to Nord Stream 1 and 2, which has been a controversial pipeline since the start of the war. However, I do not think the risk levels to our cables and pipelines are anything like those relating to Nord Stream 1 and 2. Having said that, we cannot ignore this risk and we will continue to work with our colleagues in the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications to do what we can to enhance the surveillance and protection of this infrastructure.

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