Pa Daly (Kerry, Sinn Fein) | Oireachtas source

We have discussed automated data exchange under the Prüm framework on several occasions in addition to cross-border databases related to crime. As we outlined before, Sinn Féin welcomes this co-operation as long as the databases are operated with the correct level of oversight.

Cross-border co-operation is a non-negotiable element of modern law enforcement, especially against organised crime. In 2017, it was estimated that there are 5,000 serious and organised crime gangs, 70% of which are active in more than three countries. Anti-money laundering regulations and civil forfeiture through the likes of the Criminal Assets Bureau have meant these gangs have become increasingly sophisticated, and some of them work in co-operation rather than in competition with each other. This poses great challenges in confronting them. I commend the efforts of An Garda Síochána in tackling large criminal organisations here in combination with other law enforcement agencies, including those in the US, Spain and the UK. There can be no hiding place for the criminal organisations. Irish organisations are alleged to have collaborated with gangs in Italy, the Balkans and the Netherlands, and they are also active in the UK, Spain and the United Arab Emirates. Clearly, more collaboration between law enforcement agencies is necessary. While we hope these gangs can be taken on, I sound a note of caution. With the disruption to criminal networks, we can expect to see increased competition for supply lines and market share. This could lead to feuding and violence, which will see ordinary communities suffering the consequences.

We need to address the underlying demand for drugs, ensure proper healthcare and tackle supply. The link between the casual use of cocaine in this country and organised crime must be highlighted. The proliferation of cocaine use in the smallest towns and villages is directly leading to the enrichment and empowerment of the organisations.

With regard to the set of measures currently under consideration, there are several points to be made. First, the facial image proposals promise much in terms of effectiveness in catching criminals, but there are civil liberties concerns. Data being available only on a hit, no hit basis, with no provision for generalised access, is welcome. It is important to streamline the exchange of personal and case-related data and ensure the automatic exchange of data for criminal investigations, with a high level of data protection. However, envisaging no artificial intelligence does not go far enough, perhaps. We should be wary of the use of automated processes using large data sets. There is a balance to be struck where serious crime is concerned. Databases should be airtight in terms of legal challenges on human rights grounds so criminals will not be in a position to overturn their convictions on technicalities and so we may protect the rights of ordinary people. Any risks of false positives should be eliminated.

Second, the central router for data needs to be properly supervised. I am curious as to whether there is a physical storage location. With the use of PULSE, we have seen that systems can sometimes be open to abuse and that access to criminal records from other countries carries a risk. This is all the more reason to have the necessary safeguards in place.

Let me sound one more note of caution related to the processes and potential abuses by EU member states. Spain, for example, was found to be using the Pegasus spyware against peaceful Catalan independence activists. International law and treaties create binding obligations in these areas. It is right and proper to proceed with caution. The motion and the measures proposed do so.

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