Matt Shanahan (Waterford, Independent) | Oireachtas source

The preamble to the Bill suggests it will give effect to the implementation of Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the member states to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the Internal Market, ECN Plus, the European Competitions Network. Essentially it is aligning our competition law with the EU legislation.

The Minister of State also suggested that the enactment of this legislation, further to some additional amendments he wishes to propose, will strengthen the powers of the State in tackling white-collar crime, economic crime and corruption. Others in the House have discussed specific areas of concern, such as public sector procurement, the construction industry, insurance services and possibly even legal and financial services.

If the question were asked in the House today how, where and on whom sanctions were placed as a result of the banking crisis, what would the answer be? How might this legislation address that? Do we seriously think that significant effort was made to pursue criminal prosecutions for those who colluded in the positioning of interest rates, the over-reporting of assets and the under-declaring of positions with respect to currency hedging and contracts for difference? How would this proposed legislation treat that situation again?

I think we know that we largely failed in our obligations to hold to account those who were colluding criminally during the banking crisis. If this legislation is enacted, will we be protected from such a scenario repeating? Does this legislation deliver the required deterrent by way of criminal sanctions?

The Minister of State has placed significant emphasis on the ability of this legislation, framed within the context of European competition network law, as being positioned to combat national and international cartels. However, how would we know if such cartels are in operation considering the difficulty up to now in surveilling and getting access to financial statements and records? The Bill outlines that the powers of ComReg and the CCPC are to be strengthened and somewhat merged in order to meet this challenge and that future surveillance powers and powers of entry will assist in this battle.

That is welcome, but will it be enough? I imagine that companies that engage in international price collusion and deliberately set out to rig bids and to compete for some tenders while strategically withdrawing from others are not waiting around, their filing cabinets full of incriminating evidence, for the CCPC or ComReg to come knocking on their doors.

In the case of public procurement, analysis of tender bids would surely point to possible price fixing. Given, however, that many of our large-scale public procurement tenders are refined down to a shortlist of three to five, it is difficult to see where and how significant price collusion might be occurring. Quantity surveillance and measurement software would probably indicate where significant or even extraordinary price gouging is taking place if only we had the ability to properly implement it. I have raised in this House a number of times the prices of general building materials in this country and how they are so similarly aligned, yet it is possible to buy similar quantities of those materials on the European mainland at significant price reductions not explainable by transport costs, warehousing or other logistics. In the context of a free European market with open borders and transparent pricing, how does this situation persist? As for building specifications, has the Minister of State's Department any intention of looking at material specifications and what manufacturers are specified within public procurement tender contracts? How is it that we can arrive at specifications and dimensions for timber and insulation materials, for example, that are not specified in other European country tenders, thereby offering much wider choice and better cost options?

The Minister of State has highlighted our dysfunctional car insurance industry and the deliberate concealing of insurance fees and claims data for years, which would have allowed further international motor insurance underwriting if potential competitor companies were able to assess the market intelligence and dynamics that were taking place. They were precluded from doing so, however, which resulted in no new appetite to enter the market for many years. I know that this situation has been largely resolved in respect of the motor insurance sector and that we now have up to 40 companies bidding for motor insurance in this country. However, what were the sanctions prescribed by the CCPC for those companies that were, in effect, breaking European consumer law? Despite progress in the motor insurance market, does the Minister of State believe there might be anti-competitive practices still ongoing in respect of personal indemnity insurance, employer's liability insurance and occupier's liability insurance? Could instances of fraudulent personal injury claims, supported in some instances by legal professionals, not be considered anti-competitive as well as downright criminal? Will the legislation the Minister of State proposes tackle white-collar crime and provide civil and criminal sanctions for those found guilty of same, and will they be pursued? I fully understand the need for this legislation to comply with European legislation and for our courts to integrate accordingly, but we have a history in this country of not pursuing white-collar crime. Even when we do, derisory financial punishments are usually the order of the day. If there are teeth to this legislation, the public will need to see those teeth in order to have any confidence that this proposal from the Minister of State is a game changer, which I hope it is.

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