Jack Chambers (Dublin West, Fianna Fail) | Oireachtas source

I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak on behalf of the Government on the Bill before the House this evening. Deputy Doherty's Bill from 2014 proposes that a referendum should be held with the aim of removing Article 17.2 from the Constitution. The drafting of legislation for the holding of any constitutional referendum requires detailed consideration of the proposal at issue. Significant analysis should be done on the implications of the constitutional change. There should be consultation with stakeholders and experts, legal opinions and analysis should be sought and, importantly, the fiscal implications should be closely investigated. Nothing of that nature is evident in this proposal. If such work had been done on this Bill, which proposes the deletion of one of the essential components of our democratic framework, it would have become clear that this is not a credible proposition. It is certainly not a Bill the Government can support.

Our parliamentary democracy, like very many others across the world, is founded upon a three-way balance of power between the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. In any healthy democracy there exists a system of checks and balances between the Parliament, the Government and the courts. Bunreacht na hÉireann provides our democracy with just such a framework, one that has served this State well over the decades.

Article 17.2, which this Bill proposes to remove from the Constitution, states:

Dáil Eireann shall not pass any vote or resolution, and no law shall be enacted, for the appropriation of revenue or other public moneys unless the purpose of the appropriation shall have been recommended to Dáil Eireann by a message from the Government signed by the Taoiseach.

Put plainly, the deletion of this provision from the Constitution would have a detrimental impact on the important balance of power that lies between the Legislature and the Executive. Article 17 cannot be read in isolation. It is not a stand-alone proposition in the Constitution, but rather one that must be read in conjunction with Articles 11, 21, 22, 24, 28 and 33, as together they address the State's finances. In essence, when read together they provide that neither the Executive nor the Legislature can validly authorise the expenditure of public moneys without the consent of the other branch. In this way, they provide us with what might be seen as a double lock.

Article 11 of the Constitution creates a Central Fund and provides that:

All revenues of the State from whatever source arising shall, subject to such exception as may be provided by law, form one fund, and shall be appropriated for the purposes and in the manner and subject to the charges and liabilities determined and imposed by law.

Article 17 of the Constitution provides routes for the Dáil to address financial matters through the Estimates process, the Appropriation Acts and under specific legislation. Article 17.2 provides that the right of initiative in relation to public finance is vested in the Government. This is reflected in our Dáil Standing Orders which are agreed by this House and provide that a Bill or an amendment to a Bill which imposes or increases a charge upon the people or appropriates revenue or other public moneys, or a motion to grant money for the public service, can be initiated only by a member of the Government. Furthermore, any motion to grant money must be decided without amendment. Accordingly, in relation to expenditure, taxation, or charges on the people, it is for the Government to initiate the proposals and place them before the Dáil for approval. It is then for the Dáil to either approve or refuse the measures proposed.

The concept of the balance of power between the Legislature and the Executive is further emphasised by looking at Article 17 in conjunction with Articles 15 and 28. Article 15.2.1° states that "the sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has powers to make laws for the State."

Article 28.2 states that "the executive power of the State shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, be exercised by or on the authority of the Government." Therefore, neither the Government nor the Legislature can validly authorise the expenditure of public moneys without the approval of the other. This is a fundamental proposition of our constitutional model.

Article 28.4.1° states that "the Government shall be responsible to Dáil Eireann". As it is the Government that is accountable to the Dáil, the absence of Article 17.2 would mean that the Dáil would be free to initiate spending proposals, but without the corresponding, essential accountability to the Dáil for such expenditure. It is evident, therefore, that Article 17.2 of the Constitution is an important provision to support the sustainable management of the public finances. It reflects the Government's responsibility for raising revenue and its accountability for expenditure within the overall constitutional framework. Such decisions lie across the full range of policy areas, including health, justice, education, social protection, climate, the arts, sport, an Ghaeilge, defence and many others. Given the need to ensure any legislative proposals on additional spending or tax matters can be funded within the overall financial resources available, Article 17.2 provides an important safeguard. This provision supports the sustainable funding of legislative proposals within the context of the national and EU fiscal parameters and the fiscal position of the State, including the overall level of debt.

The management of the public finances is subject to both domestic and EU legislation. Fiscal policy must comply with the Stability and Growth Pact and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union in which the budgetary and debt rules were given effect by the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012. Given that the Government must operate its budgetary policy within this legislative framework, a key consideration of legislative proposals that have fiscal impacts is the potential funding implications that may arise.

While Deputy Doherty's Bill presents itself as the foundation for what he terms an "inclusive budgetary process", it is far from clear how this proposal genuinely achieves that aim. In opposing this legislation, the Government is certainly not opposing an inclusive budgetary process. In this regard, a number of reforms have been implemented in recent years to support a more open budgetary process and to facilitate greater engagement with the Oireachtas.

The programme for Government commits to a continuation of this process of reform. Budgetary reforms in recent years have included the publication of the summer economic statement and the mid-year expenditure report which supports advanced pre-budget scrutiny. Alongside the mid-year expenditure report, the spending review papers are now published. Among the objectives of the spending review process are the assessment of the effectiveness of public spending in delivering on policy objectives and the development of policy making informed by evidence.

Performance budgeting has been a key focus of budgetary reform. With the change in the budgetary timetable in 2013, and the Revised Estimates Volume, REV, now being published in December each year, this provides an opportunity for earlier engagement by Oireachtas committees with the Estimates. The REV itself has developed significantly in recent years and now routinely includes details on activities, outputs and context-specific outcome indicators. Dáil reform has also seen the establishment of the Committee on Budgetary Oversight in 2016, which has enhanced the role of the Oireachtas in the budgetary formation process. The committee carries out ex antescrutiny of revenue and expenditure options before the budget. It also does ex postscrutiny to evaluate budget measures or to assess how budgeted spend or revenue projections compare with outturns. It monitors macroeconomic developments and fiscal risks and prepares an annual pre-budget report. This budgetary reform also included the establishment of the Parliamentary Budget Office which assists the committee through providing it with evidence-based research and analysis.

All of these reforms have facilitated greater input by the Dáil in the overall budgetary process; indeed, one might say it is an inclusive budget process. The principal point at issue is that while the Executive has the right of initiation in regard to the expenditure of public moneys, the Dáil is the only body that can approve any such proposals. The Government is accountable to the Dáil for any such proposals. These constitutional propositions form part of the fundamental building blocks of our democratic parliamentary arrangements. They have, as I said, served the State well over the decades. The deletion of Article 17.2 would seriously undermine the balance of power between the Legislature and the Executive, and could also have grave consequences for the economy.

Nearly 300 years ago, Montesquieu laid out the basis of the doctrine of the separation of powers as we know it in his famous work, "The Spirit of the Laws". His fundamental political premise has been and continues to lie at the heart of every functioning parliamentary democracy the world over. The key is to have checks and balances between the different branches of the State. Article 17.2 of the Constitution, in its own perhaps understated way, is a crucial part of this balance of powers in our democratic system when it comes to the expenditure of the people's money. It is essential that it remains part of our Constitution. The Government is opposing this Bill.

See this speech in context