Dáil debates

Thursday, 11 February 2021

Counterfeiting Bill 2020: Second Stage

 

10:10 am

Photo of Mairead FarrellMairead Farrell (Galway West, Sinn Fein) | Oireachtas source

Mar a dúirt an tAire Stáit, is Bille sách teicniúil é seo ach is Bille fíorthábhachtach é agus mar gheall air sin, beidh muid ag tacú leis. Beidh sé ag dul chuig na coistí agus ba bhreá liom dá mbreathnódh muid níos gaire ar pháirt 3 agus páirt 9. Tá na páirteanna sin fíorthábhachtach agus chóir dúinn breathnú níos géire orthu agus muid ag plé an Bhille sna coistí. There is a perception domestically and internationally that Ireland can be soft on white collar crime. On the issue of the transposition of EU directives which are designed to improve transparency and accountability and provide sanctions to deter those tempted to engage in wrongdoing, Ireland is often frustratingly slow to implement these directives. In fact, it sometimes seems that we are the unruly child who must be dragged by the ankles, kicking and screaming, to get in line with our EU peers. We were slow to implement the EU financial instruments directives which provided for greater regulation to increase transparency across European financial markets and standardise the regulatory disclosures required for firms. We were slow to transpose the EU anti-money laundering directive which was designed to combat money laundering and prevent the financial market from being misused for those purposes. In fact, we were so slow to implement this directive that the European Court of Justice ordered Ireland to pay €2 million in fines last year. That is remarkable, considering that a report by Europol found that between 2006 and 2014 Ireland had 2% of all reported suspicious financial transactions of EU member states. We have also been slow to implement the outstanding elements of the EU directive on the protection of the euro and other currencies against counterfeiting, which is the Bill that is now before the House.

As the Minister of State mentioned, this is a highly technical but very important Bill. The deadline for transposing the directive was 23 May 2016. Ireland is the only member state that is yet to transpose it. By way of background as it is quite technical legislation, the Bill provides for the implementation of several European instruments relating to the protection of the euro from counterfeiting. It concerns measures to ensure the appropriate authentication of euro coins and notes and it calls on member states to introduce criminal offences and sanctions relating to counterfeiting of the euro and other currencies. It introduces common measures in respect of same. The directive also addresses territorial jurisdiction and requires special investigation measures. The importance of protecting against counterfeiting lies in the need to ensure confidence and trust in the authenticity of currency. The Bill provides for a range of new powers and functions for the Central Bank of Ireland in respect of monitoring and enforcing measures relating to suspect counterfeit euro currency and euro currency that is not deemed suitable for recirculation.

Since its introduction in 2002, the euro as a currency has been continuously targeted by organised crime groups active in money counterfeiting. Counterfeiting of the euro has caused financial damage of at least €500 million. According to the ECB, there were approximately 24 billion euro banknotes in circulation, with a total value of close to €1.3 trillion.

In the second half of 2019, the €20 and €50 notes continued to be the most counterfeited banknotes, jointly accounting for over 70% of all counterfeits.

As the Minister of State outlined, this Bill comprises 31 sections and I certainly do not propose to go into all of them. I will merely touch on two of the sections which I think are the most pertinent and might need greater scrutiny on Committee Stage before making a broader point that I am worried this legislation will not address but which needs to be highlighted as it relates to wider criminality and white-collar crime.

The first section I wish to highlight is section 3, which expands definitions to include computer programmes, data and other means of counterfeiting. I note that the Government has made certain commitments on combating cybercrime in the report on the future of policing, including the provision of more expertise and resourcing for emerging areas of crime, especially related to technological innovation. It is worth flagging that there is concern that some gangs have become increasingly technically savvy and are able to use bitcoin and those kinds of things for illicit transactions. I hope that the additional resources that have been promised will meet the needs of the moment because laws are all fine and good but if these organised crime gangs are becoming more technically savvy than our law enforcement officials, there is a real risk they will be able to run rings around the law. Enforcement is, of course, key, as well as resourcing.

I also wish to flag section 9 of the Bill, which concerns criminal liability for corporate bodies where they or their staff may have been engaging in, or benefiting from, counterfeiting. However, just as was the case with the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) (Amendment) Bill 2020 we discussed two weeks ago relating to fraud and embezzlement against the EU budget, there is a significant defence created for these entities if they can prove they took "all reasonable steps and exercised all due diligence" to prevent such behaviour. I have concerns about this provision because this potentially provides a get-out-of-jail-free card for larger companies that might benefit from these activities, particularly financial institutions. A recent example of which we are all aware was the so-called Russian Laundromat, which showed the interactions between dark networks and white-collar crime. In other words, there are occasions when illicit financial transactions can use the licit economy to disguise the proceeds of crime. I would be concerned were there to be light-touch regulation that makes our financial system susceptible to misuse by those engaging in financial crimes. That is, of course, very concerning. Anyone who has ever reviewed some of the prospectuses for certain companies from emerging markets that list debt on the Stock Exchange and some of the questionable risks they list therein will know what I am talking about. This will need to be looked at more closely on Committee Stage but I flag those concerns today.

I also raise an issue that I do not think has been addressed by the various EU directives that have been transposed recently and which relates to organised and white-collar crime. It plays a key role in illicit financial transactions and touches on the idea that legitimate parts of our financial system can be used in the service of illicit purposes. The issue to which I am referring is the use of high denomination notes. High denomination cash notes are, of course, perfectly legal but the reality is there is considerable concern that they are primarily used by people involved in organised crime. We know that high denomination notes play a significant role in global money laundering, corruption, tax dodging and organised crime. We can all ask ourselves when was the last time we saw a €500 note in the flesh. I would hazard a guess that most people have never seen one, let alone had one in their possession. There is concern about that.

Over ten years ago, Britain's regulatory authorities banned the use of €500 banknotes in Britain after a study by the financial intelligence unit found that more than 90% of €500 banknotes in Britain were used by criminals. Tests by the Serious Organised Crime Agency revealed that it was possible to carry €25,000 in €500 notes in a cigarette packet, €300,000 in a cereal box and €1 million in a small briefcase. That provides a stark visual for how these high denomination notes can be used and how easily they can be transported. The €500 note is the highest value euro banknote and was produced from the introduction of the euro in 2002 until it stopped being printed in 2014. Two years ago, the printing of this banknote was stopped by central banks in the euro area but it nevertheless continues to be legal tender and can be used as a means of payment. Whether it needs to be taken out of circulation altogether needs to be looked at.

Mar a dúirt an tAire Stáit ag an tús, tá sé fíorshoiléir gur Bhille sách teicniúil é seo agus go bhfuil sé tábhachtach. Mar sin, táimid ag tacú leis. Beidh sé an-suimiúil é a phlé sa choiste agus mar a dúirt mé, ba cheart dúinn breathnú ar an dá alt sin, alt 3 agus alt 9, chun cinntiú go bhfuilimid ag déanamh chuile rud gur féidir linn chun stop a chur leis an gcineál oibre seo nó an misuse ar chúrsaí airgid. Tá súil agam go ndéanfaidh muid chuile rud gur féidir linn chun stop a chur leis seo.

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