Ossian Smyth (Dún Laoghaire, Green Party) | Oireachtas source

I have heard the contributions of the Deputies and I thank them, in particular Deputy Nash for outlining his personal experience as a Minister of State who did not retain his seat and his feeling that the last place he wanted to be was back in the Dáil. I also thank Deputy Gannon for his contribution.

Something that struck me was the reference by Deputy Tóibín to the lack of accountability that a Minister would have where that Minister was not planning to run for election again. Deputy Tóibín described a situation where such Ministers are surely completely unaccountable because they will not be held to account by the electorate and will not be held up to that standard in a general election. Of course, many people who are in ministerial office are at the end of their parliamentary careers. They are not planning to run for election after that term but they still want to do a good job. There are other mechanisms of accountability. They do not want to be remembered in the media, or by the critics or public, as somebody who did a poor job. That is how I want to address the accountability question.

With regard to the concept that a person who has not won a general election should not be in ministerial office, we have to remember that according to the Constitution, two Senators can occupy ministerial office. At present, my colleague, Senator Pippa Hackett, is doing a great job at the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine. What if a Deputy who is a Minister planned to move to the Upper House for the next stage of his or her career? The Seanad election must be held within 90 days of the general election but the Bill proposes that within 42 days of the general election, Ministers should be deposed.

Everybody in the House would agree that it is far from ideal for the process of Government formation to take a matter of months rather than days or weeks. However, we must also take account of the unprecedented public health challenge faced by the State both then and now. That was the main cause of the delay. It is my sincere hope that in future, no outgoing Minister or incoming Government will face a crisis of such magnitude that it requires the full resources of the State to be brought to bear as a matter of supreme urgency. Such a hope is almost certainly in vain. In practical terms, it is easy to foresee that taking an arbitrary and inflexible approach such as that proposed in the Bill would have a detrimental impact on the ability of the State to respond to future crises. Further practical and administrative issues are also foreseeable, including making arrangements for the engagement and remuneration of a Minister who may only be in office for a matter of days or weeks in order to tick the box of meeting the proposed obligation while the final composition of the incoming Government remains to be decided.

To the best of my knowledge, there have been only two other occasions when the process of Government formation exceeded the six-week period stipulated in the Bill, in one case by only a matter of days. Historically, the time taken to form a Government has tended to average approximately 20 days. Aside from these practical concerns, I have outlined the constitutional issues that are immediately apparent when considering the Bill. While the Government notes the points raised by Deputy Tóibín and other speakers, for the reasons I have outlined, the Bill cannot be supported.

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