Clare Daly (Dublin Fingal, Independent) | Oireachtas source

Amendments Nos. 4 and 10 attempt to row back on the amendments that Deputy Wallace succeeded in getting passed on Committee Stage. Amendment No. 5 is really a companion amendment to the amendments we succeed in getting through on Committee Stage and will be necessary if those two amendments remain in the Bill. I believe that they should remain.

The Bill has undoubtedly improved a good deal from what it was originally, thanks in large part to the work of Senator Higgins. One of the biggest problems with the provisions in question is the fatal undermining of voluntary consent. They enshrine coerced consent in a certain way. That is why we will be sticking to our guns.

I find it unbelievable that we have to argue this point at all. It is so clearly wrong that the State would hold a person's social welfare payments hostage until that person surrenders or gives up the right to privacy, which is one of the fundamental rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.

However, that is how the public services card has been used by the Department of Employment and Social Protection to date. If someone wants to use the public services card to verify their identity or give a body access to their public service identity, that is absolutely fine. We have no problem with that and nothing we are putting forward here impedes that. All we are saying is that if people do not want to do that, they should not have to and should be able to produce something such as a passport.

I do not know whether the Minister of State has changed his tune on this but when it was raised in the past, he told us that alternative ways to verify one's identity would always be offered. If that was the case and the Minister of State is sticking to that, what is the harm in accepting our amendment, which would not undermine that? I am unsure where the Minister of State is coming from on that. If an alternative mechanism is not provided for, we wholly believe it ought to be. We are not prescribing what an individual service provider should use, nor do we care what they require, merely that it cannot be the only provision.

Leaving aside some of the discussions that took place on Committee Stage, there is a serious point at stake. It is one thing to submit a photograph or document with one's address but quite another to be required to provide a facial image with a biometric scan. I hope that the Minister of State does not tell us again that the public services card database does not store biometric data, as we are sick hearing it. The intrusiveness of the data requirements of the public services card means it is in breach of the requirement under EU and ECHR law that state interference with privacy must be both necessary and proportionate. The public services card is not necessary because alternative forms of identification, including passports, are available and were previously sufficient for the purposes of accessing public services. The idea of it causing a systems breakdown going into overload does not apply here. Most people will probably not have a problem offering the information but it is for those who do not want their data shared across potentially 150 organisations. In that sense, the public services card is disproportionate because it requires people to link all their personally identifiable information into one database shared by numerous agencies, and that interferes with privacy rights in a manner that far exceeds the stated goal of easy and convenient service access. To put all this private information into a hackable database goes even further than that. It is absolute lunacy.

The key phrase here is "state interference with privacy". If the State asks a person if he or she wants to give certain pieces of personal information and in return, that person will be given a handy card that he or she can use for all public services, many people would say "Yes". If the State asks, interference with privacy does not apply. Where it becomes an interference with privacy is when the State puts a gun to someone's head and demands all their data or their services will be cut off. I do not understand why the Government cannot appreciate that point. By interfering with privacy in a way that is neither necessary nor proportionate, I guarantee that the State is setting itself up for all sorts of problems, not only with the ECHR but also with general data protection regulation, GDPR. Without question, if the Government succeeds in removing our amendments, it will result in fines being levied. I hope the amendments are not removed and that amendment No. 5 is approved to go in tandem with it.

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