Dáil debates

Wednesday, 4 July 2018

Pathway to Redress for Victims of Convicted Child Sexual Abusers: Motion [Private Members]

 

6:35 pm

Photo of Catherine ConnollyCatherine Connolly (Galway West, Independent) | Oireachtas source

I have no hesitation in supporting this motion and I thank Fianna Fáil for bringing it forward. The motion does not exclude people. It asks for certain people to be included. It is at the discretion of the Government to make it as broad as it wants.

I took the trouble to get the European Court of Human Rights judgment and I have read it. I advise the Ministers to read it, not alone in regard to this case but in regard to the background and what the case highlighted in terms of previous reports. To take such a narrow interpretation of this judgment is simply not based on reality and it is certainly not based on a reading of the case. I do not know how, given the circumstances, the Minister can sit there and justify a narrow interpretation of it based on a prepared script without reading the case. It is in very clear English and is very simple. It is a majority ruling. It is important to realise that this case is based on a case taken in the Irish courts, beginning in 1988, when Ms O'Keeffe instituted proceedings, and going right up to 2014.

Can Members imagine such a period of time? It was 26 years. More importantly, we are approaching nearly 50 years. I could take any year and note that we have failed utterly to learn.

I refer to the judgment to put things in perspective. The Government argues that a narrow interpretation is justified and that the State did not know. This case is based on a young girl who was abused repeatedly by a school principal, who was a married man. The patron was the Catholic Church. It is acknowledged in the judgment that the inspector from the Department went to that particular school more frequently than was usual. As such, the Department was quite aware that something was not quite right. Ms O'Keeffe had to go to the High Court where costs were awarded against her and she then had to go to the Supreme Court where the only thing it could do for her was reverse the costs order. She then had to go before the European Court of Human Rights. It is quite unbelievable that the argument was made that her application was manifestly unfounded. I do not know how any Irish Government could argue that. The majority judgment went against that. The Government argued that she had lost her victim status. The Government argued that her case was manifestly ill-founded. The judgment does not make for very pleasant reading. While I might accept that arguments have to be made on a legal basis, to persist now with those arguments against all of the evidence is unforgivable.

The judgment puts the case in perspective. In addition to the complaints being made at the time, the court looked specifically at the knowledge of the Government. It went back as far as the Carrigan report of 1931, which was followed by the Cussen report on the industrial schools in 1936 and the Kennedy report in 1970. I will stick to the Carrigan report as my time is limited. The Department of Justice refused to publish the report at the time and one can see why. Page 16 of the judgment states that the police Commissioner was an important witness for the report. He gave evidence of responses from 800 police throughout the country looking at statistics between 1924 to 1930 on the offence of defilement, carnal knowledge or rape of girls under ten years of age, between ten and 13 years of age and in other age groups. The Commissioner submitted a detailed analysis of those statistics noting, inter alia, that there was an "alarming amount of sexual crime increasing yearly [against young] children from 16 years downwards". The Department responded with a phrase like one of Lord Denning's that it could not possibly publish the report because the conclusion would have to be drawn "that the ordinary feelings of decency and the influence of religion had failed". That is exactly what happened. The ordinary feelings of decency and religion had failed utterly. Had the Government taken action on foot of the horrific rate of sexual crime in 1931, things might have changed. The Cussen report, the Kennedy report and any number of reports up to the present day tell us that the State was fully aware and colluded with the religious orders to keep things quiet.

For the third time, I appeal to the Minister to read this judgment. It does not talk about prior complaints in isolation. It refers to systemic difficulties, a failure to inspect and a failure to analyse the risk on the basis of the knowledge that was there. That knowledge was there. It is one of the clearest judgments and it is worth reading. I ask the Government not to add insult to injury by interpreting narrowly a judgment which does not deserve such treatment. I have only mentioned a fraction of what was in the reports referred to. If we are going to learn anything at all from this judgment, let us stop putting our heads in the sand and let us put our hands up.

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