Catherine Murphy (Kildare North, Social Democrats) | Oireachtas source

I welcome the opportunity to speak in this debate following the triggering of Article 50. In recent weeks there has been far too much emphasis on who should attend the negotiations on our behalf. It suggests a reliance on personal relationships to achieve the desired results, but what exactly are the desired results, or set of results? It is not at all clear. The same personal relationships were much in evidence before the general election of 2011, when the same "close relationships" arguments were advanced. However, the crisis was largely handled, or mishandled, by the intergovernmental approach of France and Germany. Nation states acted in their own interests and not as a collective. The peripheral countries paid a very heavy price and we have to learn a lesson from that. We have to know what we want and cannot rely on that approach. We have a unique set of circumstances because of the Good Friday Agreement, which was possible because of our joint membership of the EU and was underwritten by the EU.

We need to develop a shared ownership of what we want out of the negotiations, and not allow something to be done behind the scenes by a cross-departmental group and imposed on us. I am not saying that it is unimportant that cross-departmental groups work hard on Brexit but it is simply not enough for this to be where the focus is. How we approach Brexit in the context of Ireland and Northern Ireland is critical and it has been identified in the draft guidelines. No one wants a return to a hard border but there is a sizeable circle to be squared in the context of how that is achieved if the UK leaves the customs union and wants to control its own borders. The 10% of Northern Ireland exports that flow to the Republic account for €3.5 billion but just as important is the normalisation of the trading relationship that connects the two parts of our island in more than the economic sphere.

The post-conflict opportunities should be paying dividends but Brexit will set them back, possibly for years. Point 22 in the guidelines states that no agreement between the EU and the United Kingdom may apply to the territory of Gibraltar without the agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom. This is much more definitive than what is stated in point 11 as it gives a veto, whereas point 11, while welcome, appears to rely on goodwill. Language is really important because, without absolutes, one tends to have something one cannot rely on. The guideline also states:

The Union has consistently supported the goal of peace and reconciliation enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement, and continuing to support and protect the achievements, benefits and commitments of the Peace Process will remain of paramount importance. In view of the unique circumstances on the island of Ireland, flexible and imaginative solutions will be required [that states nothing concrete], including with the aim of avoiding a hard border, while respecting the integrity of the Union legal order. In this context, the Union should also recognise existing bilateral agreements and arrangements between the United Kingdom and Ireland which are compatible with EU law.

What if they are not compatible with EU law? There are many ifs, buts and maybes embedded in that and while it is welcome that the reference is included, it is not a hard commitment in the same way as for Gibraltar, where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

On trade, when triggering Article 50 the British Government sought to put in place a parallel trade deal. Article 18 of the draft guidelines states:

The British government has indicated that it will not seek to remain in the single market, but would like to pursue an ambitious free trade agreement with the European Union. Based on the Union's interests, the European Council stands ready to initiate work towards such an agreement, to be finalised and concluded once the United Kingdom is no longer a Member State.

For the next 18 months or two years, all attention will be paid to the divorce and it is only after that is finalised that the trade deal will be considered. It seems that there is the potential to identify a crisis for countries like Ireland that rely heavily on the UK for trade unless transition arrangements at least are put in place. In Ireland’s case, 20% of our trade is done with Britain. The agrifood sector accounts for 41% of trade with the UK and the SME sectors would be particularly badly affected, with 192,000 jobs and a very good regional spread at risk, or partly at risk.

We need to address a transition arrangement now, not in 18 months’ time, in addition to the work being done to identify alternative markets. Did we agree to postponing a trade deal until after the negotiations conclude? If we did not have an input into that, was it done for us and was it done with our agreement? The European Union will position itself for negotiations but we could fall badly foul of that. Trade deals take time to negotiate, sometimes years, and we will not be free to negotiate a trade deal with the UK other than as one of 27 member states. We need to know what our desired outcome is and how any interim arrangements will be handled and, just as importantly, supported.

The UK is not without clout and we could see a return to the individual nation states ensuring their interests are protected. These are nation states that have much bigger interests than ours. For example, the UK accounts for approximately 16% of the European Union's GDP. The German car industry relies quite heavily on the UK. We need to be very hard line on our desired outcomes.

The third point I want to emphasise is the need to reimagine a different kind of Europe. We hear constant references to the European project. It is not at all clear what the project was or is post the economic crash. While we are utterly focused on Brexit because it disproportionately impacts on us, Europe will change and change is not always good. Jürgen Habermas, a respected German philosopher, wrote a long essay, the English name of which is On Europe's Constitution. In it he describes how the essence of our democracy has changed under the pressure of the crisis and the frenzy of the markets. Habermas maintains that power has slipped from the hands of the people and shifted to bodies of questionable democratic legitimacy. He suggests that technocrats have long since staged a quiet coup d'état.

Newton's third law states that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. We are seeing that reaction post crash now. We cannot ignore the need to consider the type of Union to which we want to belong. Understanding why people supported Brexit or those who are supporting Marine Le Pen and others like her cannot be ignored. To quote Habermas:

Like all symptoms, this feeling of the loss of control has a real core - the hollowing out of national democracies that, until now, had given citizens the right to co-determine important conditions of their social existence. The UK referendum provides vivid evidence about the keyword "post-democracy". Obviously, the infrastructure without which there can be no sound public sphere and party competition has crumbled.

Europe needs to rebuild socially, economically and politically if it is to have democratic legitimacy. The alienation of European citizens means that politics is catching up. Europe has been rebuilt previously, with the London debt agreement a great example. We need to be ambitious and seek things that will help to rebuild. For example, we need to talk about the need for resources to free up the possibility of investing in capital projects such as housing and transport, and making us more efficient. We need a national effort and not quiet diplomacy. We need to use all of our resources across the spectrum of business and politics. Citizens need to find ways of coming together on this. We need a national approach rather than just being kept up to date with changes and negotiations as they go along.

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