Michael Noonan (Limerick City, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

Amendments No. 104 to 110, inclusive, relate to the commencement date for section 55 of the Bill. As I pointed out on Committee Stage, this measure is in no way a concession to those who have evaded tax through the use of offshore accounts or failed to disclose offshore assets or income sources. On the contrary, it is a significant withdrawal of an incentive - the opportunity to significantly mitigate penalties and avoid publication in the list of defaulters by making a voluntary disclosure to Revenue - that is currently available to all tax defaulters. Offshore defaulters will now face a harsher regime than those whose defaults occur exclusively within the State. From 1 May 2017, there will be no opportunity for offshore defaulters to make a voluntary disclosure of their defaults. This measure was put forward on the basis that, with new sources of information coming on stream, Revenue will have access to an unprecedented level of information about financial assets held around the world. As the disclosure regime is an incentive for taxpayers to disclose matters to Revenue, it makes little sense to offer incentives to tax defaulters to tell Revenue what it will already know from its sister tax administrations around the world.

While some automatic exchange of information data is already flowing to Revenue under the first directive on administrative co-operation and the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, further rich seams of new information will not begin to flow under the OECD's common reporting standards and the second directive on administrative co-operation until September 2017. In that context, it makes sense to offer people a limited chance to disclose what will otherwise become known later next year. We have estimated a yield of €30 million from the measure in the budgetary arithmetic for 2017 as a result of the expected increase in the number of disclosures relating to offshore income and assets in the period before implementation.

If insufficient time is allowed for the initiative to work, then any change in the date could prove counterproductive.

Finally, I also emphasise that the six-month timeframe is in line with the length of time afforded to individuals to respond to other similar initiatives in the past. On balance, I would consider that the date of 1 May next should be left unchanged and, therefore, I do not propose to accept these amendments.

I am, in effect, following the advice from Revenue, which recommended 1 May as the date. I ask the House to accept Revenue's advice on this occasion.

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