Simon Harris (Wicklow, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

Every action taken by the Government and the Minister for Finance has been taken with the aim outlined by Deputy Murphy: to minimise the cost of bailing out the bank to the Irish taxpayer and to restore our banking sector to a functioning reality so it can continue to serve the Irish economy. We may disagree on this, but it is the reason for the efforts undertaken by officials in the Department of Finance, whom the Deputy has rightly complimented, and by the Minister for Finance.

I have already outlined how the Minister, once these concerns were brought to his attention - after the transaction had been completed, under a relationship framework put in place by the previous Government which did not require him to be consulted - took a number of steps, including meeting the chairman and the CEO, asking the then Secretary General to meet them and seconding Mr. Neil Ryan to IBRC from the Department of Finance.

As part of Ireland's third review under the EU-IMF programme of financial support, a report on which was published in September 2011, Ireland committed to a number of conditions and actions. One of these was to develop a framework to govern the exercise of the State's ownership rights in the banks resulting from the capital injections, including to put in place relationship frameworks with the banks to protect the commercial basis for the banks' operations while under State ownership. The end of March 2012 was the deadline put in place for the introduction of these relationship frameworks with each of the banks in which the State acquired an interest in the context of the financial crisis, to govern the relationship between the State, as shareholder, and each bank. The relationship frameworks were designed to recognise the separation of each bank from the State, to ensure their businesses would be run on a commercial, cost-effective and independent basis to ensure the value of the banks as an asset to the State, and to limit the State's intervention to the extent necessary to protect the public interest. New frameworks were put in place, and the revised relationship framework introduced with IBRC was considerably more intrusive than those with the other banks, and rightly so, as this was necessary given the increased level of oversight required in view of the unique position of IBRC as a run-down vehicle financially supported by the State through the promissory notes, and the Department of Finance's experience to date with IBRC at that time.

The Deputy knows and has heard it from the Government that the ultimate decision to liquidate IBRC was taken in the context of the overall cost to the State of its orderly wind-down, which was being supported by the promissory notes at a heavy cost to the State. What concerns existed about certain management decisions are documented by the Department of Finance, and I have acknowledged them. Ultimately, the aim of minimising the cost of the orderly wind-down of IBRC was of primary concern to the Government. While it is not possible for any of us to express definitive views in the House on commercial decisions taken by boards of banks, it is possible to clearly set out the facts. I have set out the facts very clearly-----

See this speech in context