Gerry Adams (Louth, Sinn Fein) | Oireachtas source

Ba mhaith liom buíochas a ghabháil le achan duine a bhí páirteach sna comhchainteanna, go háirithe an Aire, an Teachta Charles Flanagan, agus an Aire Stáit, an Teachta Sherlock; na páirtithe uilig; Gary Hart agus ardchonsal na Stáit Aontaithe sa Tuaisceart; agus na daoine a lean ar aghaidh go stuama nuair a bhí cúrsaí deacair go leor agus faoi dheireadh a tháinig ar chomhréiteach ag an Nollaig. I want to especially thank Martin McGuinness and the excellent team of experienced Sinn Féin negotiators who provided consistent, clear and unwavering leadership, who refused to be discouraged and who worked very hard to chart a positive path to a successful conclusion. Sinn Féin was very clear about its objectives. These were: to agree a deal that would protect the most vulnerable in society; to safeguard the rights and entitlements of citizens; to deliver on outstanding agreements; to grow the economy; and to enhance the workings of the institutions.

The failure, principally of the Irish and British Governments, to implement outstanding agreements and the failure of the Irish Government especially to act as a co-equal guarantor of the Good Friday Agreement and other agreements, as well as tensions between the Executive and the British Government - most notably around British demands for welfare cuts which were blatantly supported by the Irish Government - was the context of the latest crisis. The ability of the five Executive parties to defend front-line public services, the poor, people with disabilities, the elderly and disadvantaged and to create jobs was significantly undermined by British Tory demands for welfare cuts, as well as by the £1.5 billion cut to the block grant since 2011. This austerity policy is similar to the Irish Government's and was actively endorsed by the Taoiseach. Sinn Féin was steadfast in its opposition to this agenda.

The British Government's failure to honour its commitments made in the Good Friday Agreement and other agreements, such as an inquiry into the murder of Pat Finucane, was another important factor in the crisis. The London Government's refusal to back the Haass proposals to deal with the vexed issues of identity, parading and the legacy of the past had only succeeded in emboldening unionist hostility to the power-sharing arrangements. There is never any real incentive for political unionism to move forward in a consistent and progressive way if a British or Irish Government is not giving clear and unambiguous leadership and implementing commitments.

It took between 18 months and two years for Sinn Féin to persuade the two Governments to be part of a talks process. This included the failure by the Taoiseach to meet me and the Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, over the summer, as he had promised to do as far back as last spring. By the time the Taoiseach, the British Prime Minister and the Tánaiste arrived in Belfast on 11 December, there was no great optimism that progress could be achieved. The presentation by the two Governments - through the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister - of a deeply flawed paper, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and the approach of both principals during the talks was amateurish and ham fisted. The departure of Mr. Cameron and Teachta Kenny 24 hours later led many to believe that the negotiations were over and that the political institutions were at real risk of collapsing. The intervention amounted to little more than a charade. It was not, in my humble opinion, a serious endeavour.

The paper from the Irish Government and from Mr. Cameron sought to nationalise austerity, with the Irish Government supporting British Tory efforts to hurt the most vulnerable citizens in the North. Ní raibh Acht na Gaeilge ná Bille Cearta luaite sa phaipéar a chuir siad isteach sna cainteanna. Mar eolas do Teachta Martin, beidh Acht na Gaeilge curtha amach ag an Aire, Carál Ní Chuilín, roimh i bhfad. Feicfimid cad a tharlóidh ansin. The Irish Government also acquiesced to the British Government's use of "national security" to deny information to victims and to the British demand to end the rights of families of victims to an inquest in the Coroner's Court. If this proposal had been accepted - it was rejected forthrightly by Sinn Féin - this would have left victim's families, including the Ballymurphy families - whom the Taoiseach has met and who have campaigned for decades for the right to Article 2-compliant inquests - with no access to the crucial inquest system. Without consulting victim's families and contrary to those families' wishes, the Government signed up to ending this system. This was totally at odds with the Taoiseach's promise made in this House to seek an all-party Oireachtas motion - which he has never brought forward - to support the Ballymurphy families. Nor was there any guarantee in the paper tabled initially by the two Governments that the Dublin and Monaghan bombings - also the subject of an Oireachtas all-party motion - would be considered under the proposed civil inquisitorial process under the new historical investigations unit.

On 12 December David Cameron returned to London and the Taoiseach returned to Dublin leaving the process in a worse state than it was in when they arrived. The spin from the Governments at that point was that more than £1 billion was available and that this was the best deal possible but that quickly evaporated under scrutiny.

As one British journalist put it, the British cheque book "was all stubbs and no cheques". "The €1 billion in spending power offered by the prime minister is", he added, "largely a borrowing facility which the executive can already dip into." The Government tried to sell this as a gain for the Executive and something for which we should be grateful. In fact, when the two principals left a consensus was reached by the Executive parties, on the initiative of the Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, and under the leadership of Martin McGuinness and the First Minister, Peter Robinson, there was a push for real and meaningful negotiation. Six days later and following lengthy discussions, many of which lasted into the small hours, and at least one all-night session, an agreement was achieved which reversed many of the proposals put by the two Governments. Proof of this can be found by parsing the first draft and comparing it to the final agreed draft. I invite anyone who has any doubts about what I am saying to do this.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Charles Flanagan, and Minister of State, Deputy Sean Sherlock, may recall that the negotiations eventually got on the right track when Martin McGuinness and I warned the two Governments that their proposals were not sustainable. The Taoiseach has made a habit of stating that Martin McGuinness was prepared to accept a lesser deal than I was. He also described by behaviour as "outrageous". While I could take that assertion as a back-handed compliment, I do not do so because it is totally untruthful. Martin McGuinness, who is as committed to all these issues as I am, described the Taoiseach's remark as "stupid". Why would a Taoiseach say such a thing? If he put any thought into his remark, it was obviously to distract attention from the Government's refusal to develop any strategy for engagement with the British as a co-equal guarantor of the Good Friday Agreement and other agreements.

I have dealt with every Government since Charlie Haughey's time, including a previous Fine Gael-led Government. The Administration led by the Taoiseach is the most deficient, inefficient and incompetent of all of them in dealing with the North. I do not say this lightly; it is my considered opinion.

See this speech in context