Pádraig Mac Lochlainn (Donegal North East, Sinn Fein) | Oireachtas source

In the shadowy world of modern surveillance, it is extremely difficult to definitively prove that surveillance has taken place. As said in various media interviews, it is not like in the old movies where one can unscrew one's telephone and find a bug or take the mirror from the wall and find a bug behind it. It is very difficult to prove but what we can say with certainty is that such was the toxic relationship between the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission and senior management of An Garda Síochána, the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission entertained the possibility that elements of An Garda Síochána - authorised or unauthorised - had it under surveillance illegally. That is an incredible situation to have reached.

Let us rewind the tape back to the Kieran Boylan affair. Kieran Boylan was a convicted major drug dealer suspected of being responsible for €1.7 million worth of cocaine and heroin discovered by the national drugs unit in a very solid operation in October 2005. He was in custody suspected of being involved in this major drugs find but somehow by July 2008, the charges were dropped against Kieran Boylan without any explanation. There is a range of other issues which give rise to serious concerns about why this was the case. There are suspicions that he was a Garda informer and that situations were resolved for him because of that relationship. It would be quite remarkable if that was the case because usually informers are the small guys who help to bring in the big fish. One could argue that there is a public interest in that type of situation where one gets to the big players by working with the smaller ones. However, in this case, a big player - a major convicted drug dealer - was suspected of assisting gardaí in not only capturing but imprisoning smaller drug dealers. It was a reverse of the usual approach and that is why it caused such huge public concern. If true, it would be absolutely shocking and appalling.

The Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission initiated its public interest investigation after all of these very worrying developments. It is very clear from its own report that the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission was delayed by a lack of co-operation from senior Garda management over a four-year period. We had a situation where all the protocols of senior Garda Síochána management releasing documentation to the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission within a 30-day period were, in almost all cases, broken. In one case, documentation was not submitted to the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission even after four years. This very important public interest investigation was repeatedly delayed because of the appalling lack of co-operation from the senior management of An Garda Síochána.

I understand that GSOC released not only a seven-page summary document of its report to the Department, but submitted a 600-page report on all of this to the office of the former Minister, Deputy Shatter, and to the Director of Public Prosecution. There is a very detailed report around the Kieran Boylan affair, all of the issues and all the concerns in the Minister's office. I ask the Minister to release that report into the public domain, although I appreciate she will have to do so on a redacted basis, because it will be very revealing about the real challenges the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission faced in trying to get to the truth of something that was clearly in the public interest. If the concerns prove to be true - I am not saying they are - it would be a major scandal in terms of what was happening. Some of the people who were being asked to co-operate with documentation were suspected of having facilitated this whole arrangement. That was the scale of what we were dealing with at that time.

In its seven-page summary, GSOC stated that it felt - this is very serious - that the lessons of the Morris tribunal had not been learned in terms of the handling of informers, which was core to many of the corruption issues in regard to the Morris tribunal, and the retention of contemporaneous notes. There was no way to see why decisions were made, what happened and so on. GSOC had grave concerns around all of this.

It is incredible that for months after this seven-page summary was published, the former Minister, Deputy Shatter, kept schtum. He did not say a word about the fact that for four years, senior management in An Garda Síochána did not release some documentation and delayed other documentation for years which was crucial for GSOC to do its job in the public interest.

Nothing was said about that by the then Minister, Deputy Shatter, for months. Finally, under sustained pressure from the Opposition, protocols were drawn up which I hope will now ensure that An Garda Síochána senior management fully co-operates with the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission, GSOC, so that it can be seen to do its job in the public interest. That was the environment that led to the remarkable situation where the three members of the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission entertained the potential that elements of An Garda Síochána, either authorised or unauthorised, were surveilling illegally upon them. That is a profound issue.

We know now that GSOC brought in Verrimus following a recommendation from its sister organisation in England. Verrimus is an internationally respected security organisation. Many of its staff have experience in the security world. They know it very well and they understand the techniques and modern technology used as well as the evasion techniques used to cover people’s tracks. They know what they are doing. A company of its stature advised GSOC that there were a number of potential threats. I still believe that given the type of expertise involved, in addition to the other issues Verrimus uncovered, given the lack of co-operation, procrastination and resistance GSOC faced from senior Garda management in the new dispensation in which members were being held accountable for their actions, it was justified in setting up a public interest investigation to take matters to the next level.

We will never know for sure what happened. It is difficult to get definitive evidence. However, what we do know is quite alarming. Everyone was waiting for the report last week. As Opposition spokespersons we were all asked by the media whether we were on stand-by to give a response. We said we needed a chance to read through the report or at least to read the conclusions and recommendations before giving a response. We waited and eventually at 8.45 p.m. the report was released on the evening in question. The Minister gave a simultaneous press release at Government Buildings and she appeared on the "Prime Time" programme to convey the Government’s message on it. Essentially, the message was that there was nothing to see and it was time to move on. I am interested in the latter part of the message because one must learn the lesson and put in place a response.

I am still not convinced there is nothing to see. When I read through the entire report a number of issues gave rise to concern, not least conclusion 15. Reference has been made to it but I will read it into the record because it is useful. It states: "in the somewhat febrile world of covert surveillance and counter-surveillance techniques, it is ultimately extremely difficult to determine with complete certainty whether unexplained anomalies of the kinds identified in this instance were or were not attributable to unlawful intrusion." Mr. Justice Cooke acknowledged in conclusion 16 that there may be a need for further investigation but he does not recommend it. However, it is not quite a case of there being nothing to see. Despite the media briefings during the day that GSOC was going to have egg on its face, Mr. Justice Cooke acknowledged in conclusion 11 that it had acted in good faith. One could ask what else it was to do when presented with those matters. I acknowledge that he does criticise GSOC’s decision to go ahead with a public interest investigation and he also criticised its failure to inform the Minister when the investigation was completed. GSOC would argue that its interpretation of the legislation is somewhat different.

I draw the Minister’s attention to the reference in the report to the white van with blacked out windows on the street. Many Verrimus operatives are former intelligence agents trained by MI5 or the CIA. They are not greenhorns. They know the techniques of surveillance. They felt it noteworthy to report the van to Mr. Justice Cooke and to put Verrimus’s reputation on the line. I find that intriguing. They also drew attention to the man going into the coffee shop with a bag and an object in a box. What worries me most however is the incident in the airport where a man with a bag over his shoulder sought to take a photograph. The operatives turned away but he took a photograph when they turned around again. That is known as being burnt in the surveillance world; when the opposition sends a clear warning.

Mr. Justice Cooke acknowledged that if spying took place it was on Verrimus not GSOC. I am very concerned about those matters, in particular given the type of people who reported them, because they know what surveillance is and they understand the techniques. That demonstrates to me that surveillance was taking place. Something was going on that was sanctioned by agencies of this State. I do not buy into a low-level criminal interest in GSOC. Somebody sanctioned by this State felt it necessary to be involved in some level of surveillance. That is my view based on what I read in the report. I appreciate that the terms of reference given to Mr. Justice Cooke meant that as a retired High Court judge he could not convict somebody nor could he send someone to prison. He could not press charges based on the evidence he had. The threshold was set high. However, he could clearly not rule out that something had happened. He was in a dilemma and he erred on the side of caution. That is fair enough. I appreciate that he had a job to do, but the terms of reference were somewhat limited.

We will never know for sure what happened but I am giving my tuppence worth. I believe that something toxic happened due to the relationship between senior management of An Garda Síochána and GSOC. Some things had not changed in terms of the culture that was so exposed by the Morris tribunal, one that revealed an abuse of power and that was supposed to have been reined in by GSOC and the new Garda Inspectorate.

The Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality met the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland in the North last week. Its members have the same security clearance as any police officer. It has a responsibility to look for everything. When it commences an investigation in the public interest it demands full co-operation. There is some conflict with the PSNI about that at the moment but the ombudsman is very clear that its members have access to everything in the course of carrying out investigations. There is no such thing as security concerns or the view that they are not up to the same standard as members of the police force.

One could ask why no Minister or spokesperson on behalf of the Government have said one word in anger about the fact that for four years the former Garda Commissioner refused to hand over documentation to GSOC in a public interest investigation. Concerns were expressed that a major convicted drug dealer got away with €1.7 million worth of heroin and cocaine without explanation because he was working as an informer to pinpoint smaller drug dealers to make some gardaí look good. That is the allegation. That is extremely serious yet when GSOC sought to investigate the matter thoroughly in order to allay public concern it was utterly frustrated over a four-year period. Nobody in government has said a word in anger about all of that. Nobody in government has said it is absolutely outrageous that the senior management of An Garda Síochána did not fully co-operate and give every item of documentation sought in order to reach a speedy conclusion to the investigation. It is clear that GSOC found itself in a situation where it could not do its job. It is deeply worrying that it got to the point that it entertained and still holds the view that it was possibly being surveilled upon by elements of this State.

It is clear that Verrimus believes there was physical surveillance, not just Internet surveillance. These are extremely serious matters.

We are discussing a review today, not a commission of investigation, because Mr. Justice Cooke did not have the ability to compel documents or witnesses or make adverse findings of fact. It was merely a review and I accept that he gave it the best he could. There are contradictions in his review. He struggled with having to decide and could not reach the threshold he required. The report raises more questions than it answers and I worry that a person in an agency of the State felt it was acceptable not to co-operate with a public interest investigation by the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission, GSOC. Further, this person then felt it acceptable to keep a close eye on the affairs of an independent ombudsman who functions on behalf of the people to investigate our concerns.

Will the Minister release the 600-page report by the Garda Ombudsman into the Kieran Boylan affair? The Minister may take advice from the Attorney General as to whether to redact it but it should be released into the public domain so a spotlight can be shone on the period. The former Minister for Justice and Equality, Deputy Shatter, failed to make a statement expressing a view on how long it took the investigation to receive documentation and the fact that some was never handed over. Will the Minister do so?

We will never know some things but the Government can assist with other things. There is consensus on the fact that the powers of the Garda Ombudsman must be strengthened. We must amend legislation so that all ranks of gardaí, from those on the front desk to the Garda Commissioner, must co-operate fully with investigations carried out by the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission. This must be done quickly and without procrastination. We must have an independent Garda authority to hold all gardaí to account. We need a new beginning.

I have played football and served on community groups and committees with members of the Garda Síochána. The overwhelming majority are people of outstanding decency and character, patriots who seek to serve the State. However, a corrosive culture exists all the way up to top-ranking senior management and it has failed those gardaí. They are demoralised and need a fresh start. I am proud of the vast majority of the men and women of the Garda Síochána and how they have served us through the years but I am ashamed of the behaviour of some of them. I am ashamed of some of the issues that necessitated the investigation carried out by Mr. Justice Cooke. Whatever we do, those issues must be resolved. We must use this crisis as an opportunity for a new beginning. The Garda Síochána is a service, not a force. We must ensure the men and women who join that service can be confident they can progress through the ranks if they have the ability. When they speak out against wrongdoing they must be heard and protected. When members of the public raise issues those matters must be fully investigated by a strong ombudsman that is not blocked in any way. These are the challenges that lie ahead.

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