Alan Shatter (Dublin South, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

I would like to begin by emphasising the important public role played by An Garda Síochána as the police force in this State and by the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission, GSOC, as the independent body with the important remit of investigating allegations of police misconduct. Each is a crucial pillar in our constitutional democracy and each plays a vital role in the public interest. It is of vital importance that public confidence is maintained in each of these bodies and that when carrying out their duties they at all times behave in a manner which is appropriate. Each of them has an important and separate investigative role and it is crucial that this role is exercised with the utmost integrity and any conclusions reached when investigations are undertaken are based on well-founded and solid evidence.

It is of vital importance that both organisations comply with their statutory reporting obligations and communicate clearly on issues of public concern and leave no room for ambiguity. It is also important that each organisation respects the role of the other and is mindful of the service they perform in the public interest. Each must be conscious of how their actions and words may affect public confidence in each organisation but must show no fear or favour when seeking to ascertain the truth on issues no matter how difficult or potentially controversial. This is my basic starting point in my reporting to the House this evening.

I welcome this opportunity to place on the record of this House the facts as they are known to me about allegations that the offices of the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission were subject to surveillance. As the House will be aware, these allegations first surfaced in a newspaper last Sunday under the headline "GSOC under high-tech surveillance". It is important to say at the outset that GSOC has informed me that, after an investigation, it concluded that no definitive evidence of unauthorised technical or electronic surveillance of its offices was found. Moreover, it has informed me that its databases have not been compromised. In other words, it has not been established that the offices of the ombudsman commission were subject to surveillance. Some public comment has proceeded on the basis that it is an established fact that the offices of the commission were bugged when clearly it is not.

I first learnt of these allegations from the newspaper report last Sunday. I immediately made contact with my officials and we arranged to meet yesterday with the chairman of the commission, Mr. Simon O'Brien. For reasons which I hope the House will understand, I refrained from public comment on this matter until that meeting was held and I had a chance to brief my colleagues in Government on the matter this morning.

I will now set out the facts on the basis of the briefing which I received from the commission. I want to emphasise that this account is based on the information available to me at present. The House will understand that there needs to be, and is, continuing engagement between my Department and GSOC about this matter. I have requested that I be furnished with the report received by it arising out of the security check on its offices and I await its response to this request.

The issue in question arose following a security sweep, in September 2013, of GSOC's offices in Dublin. I am informed that there was no specific concern which caused GSOC to organise the security sweep, which was carried out by a security firm based in Britain. It was a routine sweep of a nature which had occurred previously. I do not think anyone could argue that it is unreasonable for a body which, of its nature, holds sensitive information to take measures to ensure the security of its communications.

I am aware that, in the normal course, it is not desirable to put in the public domain issues relating to security of technology and communications but, because of the particular public concerns which have arisen in relation to this issue, I will give the House as much information as I can. I am concerned too that some of the public comments which have been made may have inadvertently led to some confusion surrounding this issue.

I am advised by GSOC that the sweep identified what it refers to as two technical anomalies which raised a concern of a surveillance threat to GSOC. I should emphasise that my understanding is that what was at issue were potential threats or vulnerabilities, not evidence that surveillance had, in fact, taken place. A subsequent sweep identified a third potential issue. There was no suggestion that there was any risk of unauthorised access to the GSOC databases and the documentation on them.

The first identified issue arose from a Wi-Fi device, the property of GSOC acquired in or about 2007 or early 2008 located in its boardroom, which was found to have connected to an external Wi-Fi network. Access to this device was protected by a password, and in the absence of this password any connection should not have been possible. In any event, GSOC does not operate a Wi-Fi network, and had never therefore activated this device and does not even know what the password is, but the fact of the connection was a concern. How this occurred is unknown and there is no suggestion by GSOC that it resulted in any information being accessed. I am also advised that the Wi-Fi device was unable to communicate with any of GSOC's databases or electronic systems and that the boardroom is not generally used by GSOC for its meetings.

The second potential issue related to the conference call telephone in the chairman's office which was subject to a number of tests. One of the tests involved sending apparently an audio signal down the telephone line. Immediately after this transmission, the conference phone line rang. I am advised GSOC conducted a number of checks to establish the source of this telephone call, but was unable to do so. I am further advised that checks revealed no additional anomalies or matters of concern. There is no evidence of which I am aware from my meeting with the chairman of GSOC of any phone call made or received being compromised.

The third issue related to the security firm reporting the detection of an unexpected UK 3G network in the area in the locality of the GSOC offices which suggested that UK phones registered to that network making calls would be vulnerable to interception. Importantly, I am advised that neither the chairman nor any other member of GSOC or its employees use UK-registered mobile phones, so that the presence of any such device in the locality would not seem to have posed a threat to the integrity of GSOC's communications systems. There appears to be no evidence that what was detected had any direct relevance to GSOC.

As I understand it, those three issues represent the totality of the concerns which arose. I am advised that GSOC proceeded to investigate all three issues, with expert assistance from the security company involved, and, as I have indicated, concluded that no definitive evidence of unauthorised technical or electronic surveillance was found. GSOC decided that no further action was necessary or reasonably practical. I am aware that some people have called for an inquiry into this matter but this seems to overlook entirely the fact that GSOC, which is an investigatory body, carried out an investigation and itself decided that no further action was necessary.

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