Terence Flanagan (Dublin North East, Independent) | Oireachtas source

I refer to my amendment No. 131.

The Bill impacts mostly directly on the right to life which is the basic most fundamental right of all, but another human right being threatened under the Bill is the right to freedom of conscience. The vindication of this right is the objective of the two amendments I tabled, amendments Nos. 131 and 136.

The right to freedom of conscience is acknowledged in all of the major international declarations and conventions on human rights. It is also guaranteed under the Constitution, under Article 44.2.1°. While the Constitution treats freedom of conscience along with freedom of religion, it is generally acknowledged that freedom of conscience is more expansive in its scope. Believers and non-believers are bound by conscience and suffer equally if their freedom to act in accordance with their conscience is infringed or denied.

In essence, the freedom of conscience means that one cannot be coerced or compelled to do something that one believes is wrong. While we all may fail to live up to the standards to which our own consciences might aspire, it is quite another matter if we are to force a third party to do what we believe in our hearts to be wrong.

By including section 17, which deals with conscientious objection, this acknowledges the problems already identified under section 7. There would indeed be no need for a section explicitly dealing with conscientious objection were it not for the fact that the Bill proposes actions to which many people might reasonably object. In so far as they provide a statutory basis for existing medical practice, I do not anticipate that sections 7 and 8 will prompt anyone to invoke the right to a conscientious objection. I am unaware of any doctor who would refuse to help to save the life of a pregnant woman in difficulty if she were threatened by a physical illness. I doubt that any such doctor exists in Ireland. However, under section 9, doctors and others are expected to perform or facilitate a procedure in the course of which or as a result of which an unborn human life is ended. They are expected to do this despite the absence of any medical indication that it will be of benefit to the mother. It is reasonable to expect that many of those who might be expected to participate in these abortions will likely object to doing so. Despite the concession that coercing someone to participate in an abortion would be a violation of the right of freedom of conscience, section 17 is none the less woefully inadequate, as it now stands, in vindicating that right. It restricts the right of freedom of conscience to certain specified categories of person. The deliberate destruction of innocent human life is a matter of such gravity that no one can say that some people have the right not to be forced to participate in it but others do not. It is not only medical practitioners, nurses and midwives who may be complicit in an abortion. The administrators who are expected to arrange for the abortion, the hospital porters who have to facilitate it, the cleaners who have to clean up after it and others may be asked to take their own part in abortions. They all have the right to refuse and the Bill must acknowledge and protect that right.

This amendment will not render the Bill acceptable, nor will it significantly reduce the likelihood that innocent unborn life will be needlessly and deliberately destroyed. It will, however, ensure that one evil is not compounded by another.

With regard to amendment No. 136, a major flaw in subsection 17(3) restricts the right of freedom of conscience to the extent that it becomes meaningless. The doctor can wash his hands of a case but only if he arranges for another doctor to carry out the abortion. No doctor should be compelled to be a hypocrite by refusing to do an abortion but arranging for someone else to do it instead. The right of freedom of conscience is curtailed by this subsection and it also curtails the right to professional integrity. A medical practitioner, a nurse or a midwife, who forms an opinion in good faith and based on best medical practice or the best scientific evidence available to him or her at the time that the risk to the woman's life will not be averted by carrying out the medical procedure in question, or that such risk can be averted by other means, could be compelled to transfer the woman to the care of another who will perform the procedure regardless. It is at least arguable that such a medical practitioner would be engaging in professional misconduct, unethical behaviour, medical negligence or even reckless endangerment. We cannot enact a law that would force someone to do that, but this is what is proposed in subsection 17(3).

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