James Reilly (Dublin North, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

I thank everyone who contributed to the debate on this matter and to the wider debate on the Bill. We are dealing with a large group of amendments and, for the purposes of addressing them in a more precise way, I propose to divide them into smaller groups. In that context, amendments Nos. 22, 27, 32, 41, 47, 49, 53, 54, 59, 61, 85 and 129 seek to strengthen the Bill's provisions in respect of the right to life of the unborn. I am aware that concerns have been raised around the need to insert a gestation limit in respect of carrying out the medical procedures covered by the Bill. In this regard, it is important to stress again that the proposed legislation only covers situations where there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of a pregnant woman which may only be averted by termination of pregnancy. To be clear, it will only allow a pregnancy to be terminated in circumstances where it is expected that the woman will otherwise die. It has been suggested that the legislation should include a clear provision to that effect and also an explicit reference to viability. I reassure all Deputies that, as currently drafted, the Bill prohibits the killing of a viable foetus.

As previously stated, the Bill makes reference to a medical practitioner's reasonable opinion. This places a statutory duty on each medical practitioner required to form such an opinion for the purpose of legislation to have regard to the need to preserve unborn human life as far as practicable. This imposes a clear duty on medical practitioners to make every effort to preserve the life of a foetus that may be viable. The amendments to sections 7 to 9, inclusive, and 13 would express this in the body of the Bill. Sections 7 to 9, inclusive, are structured in such a way as to provide for a balancing of the rights of the unborn and those of a pregnant woman. The purpose of the legislation is not to regulate procedures which do not constitute abortion or to dictate the practice of obstetrics. To that end, using the word "is" as opposed to "may" and the phrase "may be" as opposed to "is ended" would lead to the inclusion of other procedures - for example, amniocentesis - which are not intended to be included here. Due to the unpredictability and complexity of these rare medical cases, it was not desirable to provide legislation for a specific referral pathway. Rather, it is deemed that standard medical practice will provide an appropriate mechanism for the process through which an assessment will be accessed. Furthermore, since the delivery of a viable premature infant does not constitute abortion there is no need to include mention of such procedures in the Bill.

The definition of "unborn" contained in the Bill protects the foetus from implantation until birth, including a foetus in the course of being born. This thereby closes off a potential legal irregularity in legislation which was identified by the expert group in its report on the judgment in the A, B and C v. Ireland case. The protection of the unborn from implantation is influenced by the Supreme Court judgment in Roche v. Roche & others which deemed that embryos acquire legal protection under Article 40.3.3^o of the Constitution only from the moment of implantation. For these reasons, I cannot accept the amendments to which I refer.

The other amendments in this group apply to sections throughout the Bill and aim to add some additional wording in respect of the nature of the risk to life in order to indicate that while this must be real and substantial, it does not need to be immediate or inevitable. As discussed on Committee Stage and as highlighted by the Minister of State, Deputy White, these amendments are unnecessary. Section 8 provides for circumstances where the risk to a pregnant woman's life is immediate and, therefore, by default the risk addressed by sections 7, 9 and 13 does not need to be of such a nature. In such circumstances, I cannot accept these amendments either. It is clear that we cannot set a limit on a right. Nor can we say to women that if they have been pregnant for fewer than 24 weeks we can save them but that we cannot do so if they have been pregnant for more than 24 weeks. The position is the same in respect of a cut-off point of 20 weeks. Clearly, it would be neither constitutional nor proper to try to limit women's rights in this way.

Certain Deputies referred to the liability attaching to doctors involved in carrying out these procedures. Once a procedure is carried out in accordance with the law, there is no legal exposure. The only treatment to avert a real and substantial risk to life is repeatedly referred to throughout the Bill. It is obvious that all other treatment modalities must have at least been considered - and some tried - before the relevant professional could consider that he or she could certify in a case of termination, particularly in the context of a threat of suicide.

I again thank Deputies for their contributions. I am aware that people in this House have strong views on this matter and that they are all acting out of good conscience and strong beliefs. In that context, I believe that the Bill, as constituted, will clarify the position for women in this country who require access to the services in question and for the professionals who are obliged to deliver them. The amendments, as proposed, are unnecessary.

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