Brendan Howlin (Wexford, Labour) | Oireachtas source

I will do my very best. We have been working on this Bill for a considerable length of time - since the rejection by the people of the referendum in 2011 - to structure a framework for the holding of constitutional inquiries. One or two Deputies opposite seem to be under the illusion that this is a measure to set up a particular inquiry into one particular issue. It is overarching legislation which will structure how inquiries are to be conducted by this House and by the other House in the future, including inquiries in regard to the impeachment of judges, the impeachment of the President, should it ever arise, and inquiries into legislation and on the gathering and presenting of facts. It is not legislation designed for one impending inquiry. I know people are motivated to focus on things because of the latest news cycle, but that is not what is intended here.

I want to deal with the specific amendments which we debated previously and which have been slightly amended since Committee Stage.

In essence, the argument is that 40% of any inquiry group within the House should be drawn from the Opposition and by law the chair shall be a member of the Opposition. We imbalance the proportion of time allowed in normal debate in the House in favour of the Opposition, which is right and proper, and it has always been like that. Many Deputies are disadvantaged, particularly when there is a very large majority, as they are unable to voice opinions. I am of the school of thought that believes every Member is equal in this House, although some groups demand the right to be disproportionately involved in everything. If the normal balance of the people, or the votes cast in the last election, are reflected, it is seen by these people as somehow crushing their democratic right to have their voices uniquely heard. That even applies to those Members with platforms elsewhere who have vented their views very clearly.

I dealt with the issue in amendment No. 3 on Committee Stage, and I perfectly understand the Deputy's intentions with regard to the composition of the committee of inquiry. In section 19 of the Bill, it can be seen that we have addressed this as far as is practicable. In essence, the reasoning behind the Bill is for committees of inquiry to be determined by this and the other House and not to be dictated by the Executive. Section 19(2)(g) states, "to the extent practicable, achieving a balance between committee members as regards their respective political affiliations", and that is captured as part of the Bill's proposals.

Similarly, with regard to amendment No. 4, it is not appropriate to dictate in legislation that forever more, every single inquiry to be conducted by the House under any of the provisions of the legislation, either into the impeachment of a judge or any matter of fact, should have a chair from the Opposition, even if it is demonstrably suitable for a member of the Government parties. That is wrong and it should be a matter for the House to decide. The underlying principle of the Bill, in so far as it is possible, is to confer on the Houses the autonomy to regulate and manage the conduct of inquiries. The House is the determinant of who should chair a committee and the balance to be had on that committee. All through the debate I have argued that it is inappropriate for a Whip system to operate with regard to Part 2 inquiries under this legislation. Each member of an inquiry team is obliged to find individually, with findings appropriate to the evidence heard. It is the same process as that carried out by a juror.

Neither of the amendments is appropriate. We can be myopic and seek to focus on the likely first inquiry, trying to craft legislation to suit it as opposed to what is intended in this Bill. The Supreme Court Abbeylara judgment made a very clear requirement on the State to lay out rules for inquiry. I was at the Supreme Court and the High Court and one of the big criticisms was that we did not set out clearly the procedures to leave citizens sure that there would be safe and constitutional channels dealing with inquiries.

Deputy Fleming made much of the notion of institutional bias. In the Abbeylara judgment, the Supreme Court indicated that the Houses can conduct a legitimate inquiry and rejected the idea that, intrinsically, because of the point referred to by Deputy Ross, politicians are somehow institutionally biased because that is the nature of the trade. That has already been rejected by the Supreme Court as untrue. Inquiries of the Houses allow Members to be involved in this type of investigation as long as they are on a sound constitutional basis. We have set out in this legislation the constitutional pillars allowing for inquiries. In her Supreme Court judgment, Mrs. Justice McGuinness stated:

Members of the Oireachtas have been given highly important constitutional duties; they have been elected by their constituents to fulfil these duties. If whether under Statute or otherwise they have been properly mandated to carry out an inquiry, I consider that they cannot be disabled from so doing by an automatic assumption of objective bias.

That is a clear provision.

I absolutely reject the contention of Deputy Ross that somehow this particular Parliament is so uniquely infirm that it cannot do what every other Parliament does as a matter of course. It is a poor judgment of Members of this and the other House if the Deputy truly believes that. This House can be as forthright, clear, objective, thorough, professional and parliamentary as the House of Commons, the Assemblée nationale in Paris or any other parliament that does this work as a matter of routine. In the Westminster model, people make clear differences between what goes on at Prime Minister's question time with its associated rough and tumble and the nitty-gritty work of inquiry that goes on in committee rooms. People there would not make the sort of assertions that have been made here on these matters.

I agree with much of what Deputy McDonald said and there are net issues to be inquired into. With the referendum, we sought to allow conclusions to be adduced by a committee on the basis of evidence given. The people did not accept that proposal so what is not acceptable is the assigning of culpability with regard to any matter that is not the proper remit of the Oireachtas under the Constitution as determined by the Supreme Court. That still gives us enormous scope.

We can deal with the banking inquiry as it is likely to the be first up. The people of Ireland did not need any editorial comment to come to their own conclusions on the evidence of the tapes presented. I will not say too much about a banking inquiry as I do not want to stray from the generality of our provisions. People want to know the facts in a banking inquiry and there is no need for politicians to come to a conclusion, assigning guilt to a person or persons. They want to know what happened, and the facts can be put into the public domain by calling all those involved in the run-up to the debacle of a decision made in 2008 to explain the circumstances. I do not want to be drawn into that debate in the short time we have as we can have that discussion when there are proposals to establish an inquiry. I am anxious that it should be done and there is an historic requirement for this and the other House to prove themselves capable of doing that kind of investigation and the people's work. They have risen to the challenge in the past. With this legislation we are crafting an overarching Bill designed to allow us a variety of types of inquiry, and it sets out the scope, terms and rights of people involved in this.

Deputy Ross made two other points, with the first related to the timeframe and how long would be the process. I do not know and the decision is not for me. When it comes to shaping any inquiry, the thrust of the legislation is to hand the authority to the Houses of the Oireachtas.

The Oireachtas can be assertive in these matters and determine the terms of reference, the membership and the chair. There should be some debate about that. There will have to be proportionality in respect of it in accordance with the terms of this Bill. I know it is another nice handy sound-bite but there is no question of there being a kangaroo court. We saw posters about that the last time. There will be no kangaroo court because culpability cannot be assigned in respect of any matter. Those are the confines within which an inquiry must work under the Constitution.

In respect of the two-year period, since a committee can only have a horizon of the duration of this Parliament, that would be the horizon. I hope any committee established to look at the banking situation would have different modules of work to do.

In respect of extending the scope of it to the current situation, I am sure another article will come out about that. That can be done at any time by the current Oireachtas Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform in respect of current banking oversight. There is a need to get on with that. It should be the normal bread and butter of any finance committee's work. It could hear from the Minister for Finance, who would be delighted to attend, and the Governor of the Central Bank and anybody else the committee wished to ask any questions about. What we need to do is have robust legislation that expands as much as it can but lives within the confines of the Constitution to enable this Dáil to have inquiries into matters of public concern and to stand the test of time.

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